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Abstract
Household indebtedness is rising worldwide. This study investigates one possible
driver of this increase that is rooted in the theory of permanent income: high
income expectations. We collect data from an emerging country, Thailand, as (over-)
indebtedness in markets with incomplete financial infrastructure and social security
can be devastating. Furthermore, our sample of rural households is exposed to a
high degree of uncertainty, which makes expectation formation prone to behavioral
biases. We implement a new measure for high income expectations and show that
it is strongly and robustly related to both objective and subjectively felt over-
indebtedness. Controlling for various household characteristics, unexpected shocks,
and other possible confounding factors reduces the concern about reverse causality.
In an additional lab-in-the-field experiment, we explicitly find that overconfidence,
a specific form of biased expectation, is related to overborrowing.
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1 Introduction
For households, taking out debt is a valuable tool to smooth consumption and often a
necessary precursor of private investments. However, as consumer indebtedness is signif-
icantly increasing worldwide, there is widespread concern that it may turn detrimental.
Specifically, when households face increasing di culties to repay their debts, household
well-being and consumption are threatened. Moreover, household over-indebtedness poses
a serious threat to the stability of the financial system as a whole; for example, as expe-
rienced during the U.S. financial crisis in 2007-08.
Emerging market economies are especially at risk of low growth and even financial
crises when the level of household debt is high, as not only are their institutions and
financial regulations weaker, but income inequality is also higher (IMF, 2017). Therefore,
understanding the factors and reacting to the consequences of over-indebtedness are cru-
cial for improving living conditions while also ensuring a stable development of emerging
economies. Building on the “permanent income hypothesis”, where income expectations
determine current consumption and borrowing, this paper studies one potential driver
of over-indebtedness: too high income expectations. Although being positive about the
future might have a net positive e↵ect on lifetime utility (see Brunnermeier and Parker,
2005), being too positive might lead to serious financial distress and over-indebtedness.
In general, households’ borrowing behavior around the world is still puzzling in various
aspects and often hard to reconcile with standard neoclassical and behavioral models.
Zinman (2015) argues that one reason for many unresolved puzzles is that household
debt is vastly under-researched within household finance. In the last decade, a vibrant
literature on measuring over-indebtedness has emerged (e.g. D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013;
Keese, 2012; Schicks, 2013). In contrast, its determinants are still mostly unidentified.
Our paper contributes to closing this gap by focusing on high income expectations as
one likely cause. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to study the relationship
between real income expectations and over-indebtedness.
We investigate the relationship between positive expectations and over-indebtedness
using extensive survey data on the financial situation and financial behavior of one of the
most vulnerable populations in Thailand: rural households in the north-east. A crucial
part of our survey was to collect objective and subjective data on potential symptoms
of over-indebtedness. This allows us to construct di↵erent objective and subjective over-
indebtedness indicators.1 Additionally, we quantify households’ predictions of their future
income. Instead of relying on qualitative Likert scale measures, we elicit individual distri-
butions of expected household income and set these in relation to actual income. Hence,
1 It is still a highly debated topic how to measure over-indebtedness and there is no clear-cut answer on
the right method of elicitation, which is why we construct a variety of over-indebtedness measures.
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a major contribution to the literature is that we relate the over-indebtedness indicators
to a sophisticated measure of subjective income expectations. In our regression analysis,
we control for relevant household characteristics and unexpected shocks faced by house-
holds, thereby reducing reverse causality concerns. In order to further strengthen the
contribution of our paper, we delve deeper into the causal e↵ect of positively biased ex-
pectations on overborrowing by carrying out a lab-in-the-field experiment with the exact
same respondents. In the experiment, we concentrate on one particular expectation bias:
overconfidence.
Thailand is, on the one hand, an exemplary emerging market, but, on the other, out-
standing when it comes to household finances: Financial inclusion is comparatively high,
with four out of five persons participating in the formal financial system. Simultane-
ously, household debt has increased to over 78.03% of the country’s GDP. This makes it
the emerging market with the highest household debt to GDP ratio in the world (IMF
(2017), see Figure A.1). Given these numbers, it is hardly surprising that both local policy
makers and international institutions agree that over-indebtedness is a growing problem
in Thailand (Tambunlertchai, 2015). Additionally, there are circumstances that make our
sample especially vulnerable to over-indebtedness and to struggle with financial hardship.
This part of the population faces higher uncertainty regarding their future incomes in
two ways: through the generally high level of macroeconomic volatility in emerging mar-
kets and through individual, mostly weather-related shocks, common to poor, small-scale
agricultural households (see Loayza et al., 2007; Klasen and Waibel, 2015).
Our survey results show that there is a strong and robust relationship between high
expectations and over-indebtedness. Those who have positive expectations are more likely
to be over-indebted than those with neutral or negative expectations, which we interpret
as a sign that these expectations are truly too high for some households. The results vary
slightly with respect to di↵erent debt indicators. The relationship between high expec-
tations and the objective over-indebtedness indicator is more pronounced in comparison
to the subjective indicator, but both indices are significant. Our results indicate that the
subjective indicator is not only driven by actual debt levels but also by personal charac-
teristics and perceptions, such that it measures a di↵erent dimension of over-indebtedness.
In an additional exercise, we can show that the subjective over-indebtedness indicator is
highly correlated to a qualitatively assessed income forecast (error) measure. Eventually,
we find that being more certain about the future income realization, which can be an-
other form of forecast error, is also positively related to our objective over-indebtedness
indicator. Rural households are exposed to a highly uncertain environment; hence, being
too certain about ones future income may be harmful. Our results are robust to various
sample specifications and become more precise if we exclude parts of the sample that may
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have had di culties understanding the questions on eliciting future income expectations.
In the supplemental experiment, we exogenously bias income expectations via two
treatments that vary the level of self-confidence of the respondents and, thereby, their
expected earnings. We find that overconfidence is related to more spending and over-
borrowing in our experimental setting. However, most probably due to “noise,” our
treatments themselves have no impact on overborrowing, which is why we cannot claim
a causal relationship of overconfidence on overborrowing. These results are, however, not
driven by presumably confounding factors that the treatments could have a↵ected and are
relatively robust. Rather, we find evidence for “sticky” overconfident beliefs, which also
points to a high level of perceived certainty in our sample. Furthermore, participants who
overspend in the lab are also those who experience over-indebtedness in real life. This
shows that our experiment is not “too artificial” to capture real life behavior.
Our study touches on three strands of literature: First, the literature on eliciting
and using subjective expectations data; second, research on potential behavioral biases
in financial decision-making and debt illiteracy; and, third, the literature on households’
(over-)indebtedness in emerging economies. There are at least two reasons why the rela-
tionship between income expectations and over-indebtedness should be explicitly studied
in an emerging market setting and why findings from “WEIRD”2 populations might not
translate to rural populations. First, financial literacy is substantially lower. This implies
lower debt literacy, which might hamper expectation formation on financial matters. For
example, Lusardi and Tufano (2015) find that debt illiteracy is related to higher debt
burdens and the inability to evaluate the own debt position. Burke and Manz (2014) ex-
perimentally show that economic illiteracy increases financial forecast errors. Second, the
higher uncertainty that respondents are facing distinguishes this research from work done
in “WEIRD” societies. A more volatile economic environment requires more individual
belief formation, which makes biased expectation formation more likely (see for example
Johnson and Fowler, 2011) and at the same time more dangerous. In any case, the em-
pirical evidence from WEIRD countries on the relationship between income expectations
and over-indebtedness is sparse as well. To the best of our knowledge, there is no study
that explicitly concentrates on real-life income expectations.
Our work is most closely related to Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018) and Grohmann et
al. (2019). The former find a correlation between Finnish households’ overborrowing and
extreme positive forecast errors about the financial situation of the household. They do
not analyze the e↵ect of income expectations on overborrowing but the e↵ect of financial
expectations in general, which gives more rise to issues of reverse causality. Furthermore,
the forecast errors are constructed using Likert scales and hence, cannot be quantified.
2 Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic
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They show that households exhibiting high positive forecast errors are more likely to
overborrow than households exhibiting smaller errors. Grohmann et al. (2019) conduct a
lab experiment among students in Germany that is similar to ours and link the experiment
data with data from the German Socio-Economic Panel. They find a causal link between
overconfidence and debt taking in the lab and a correlation between a simple measure
for overconfidence and the level of household debt in the panel sample. Our study di↵ers
from these two studies in that it contributes to the literature by (i) explicitly eliciting
and quantifying real income expectations and precisely measuring over-indebtedness; and
(ii) analyzing the research question in a setting where expectation formation is generally
di cult and over-indebtedness bears severe consequences.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents the survey data, discusses the
setting, and explains how our variables of interest are constructed. In Section 3, the
estimation strategy is outlined and survey results are presented. Section 4 describes the
experiment and its results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data
This section introduces the data collected during the survey and explains how the main
variables of interest are derived. We develop a measure that approximates future income
expectations, which we call the quantitative income forecast. Further, we construct vari-
ous over-indebtedness indicators to capture the di↵erent dimensions of household debt.
2.1 The Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel
The survey was conducted in Thailand in November 2017 and is an add-on project of the
Thailand Vietnam Socio Economic Panel (TVSEP).3 The TVSEP has conducted panel
surveys in rural Thailand and Vietnam on a regular basis since 2007, with recurrent
surveys in 2008, 2010, 2011, 2013, 2016, 2017, and 2019, so far. The TVSEP survey
captures the living conditions of households in rural areas that are largely engaged in
agriculture. It focuses on factors a↵ecting households’ vulnerability to poverty. Among
others, the survey includes socio-economic characteristics of every household member,
sections on household consumption and savings, crop farming, livestock rearing, and, in
particular, questions on exposure to shocks and anticipated risks. Furthermore, each wave
captures topics of current research interest. About 4000 rural households in 440 villages
across six provinces in Thailand and Vietnam are interviewed for the survey. The sample
is set to represent the rural population in these two countries while urban households are
3 See https://www.tvsep.de/overview-tvsep.html
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deliberately excluded. To obtain a representative sample, a three-stage cluster sampling
is used. The procedure is described in Hardeweg et al. (2013).
Our study is conducted in only one of the TVSEP provinces in Thailand, Ubon
Ratchathani, which borders Cambodia and Laos (Figures 1 and 2). The sample consists
of about 750 households in 97 villages. For the majority of our analysis, we concentrate on
our own survey, adding data from the 2016 and 2017 general TVSEP survey as necessary.
Figure 1: Study Site, Ubon Ratchathani Figure 2: Sampled Subdistricts
With our study, we want to gain new insights into the determinants of debt induced fi-
nancial distress within a vulnerable population. Therefore, our survey includes extensive
question batteries on objective and subjective over-indebtedness (see Sub-Section 2.4),
savings, financial literacy, borrowing behavior in general, and income expectations (see
Sub-Section 2.3). In addition, we collect data on health, subjective well-being, personality
traits, and risk preferences. We use established items to assess these data. For example,
personality traits are measured using the short version of the Big Five Inventory “BFI-S”
(John and Srivastava, 1999; Gerlitz and Schupp, 2005). We develop a broad financial
literacy score, which not only encompasses numeracy but also questions on financial be-
havior and attitude. The score is similar in style to that developed by the OECD (OECD,
2018). Furthermore, we construct a score for risk preference out of two questions: The
first one asks whether the person is generally fully prepared to take risks and the second
question specifically asks for risk-taking behavior in financial decision-making (i.e. invest-
ing and borrowing). Self-control is assessed using the well-established scale of Tangney et
al. (2004). Given the low numeracy within the sample, we add a phrase to each numerical
5
value on questions involving scales.4
We use a restricted sample for the analysis in Section 3 and exclude outliers by the
following means: We exclude (i) the 1 percent highest monthly household incomes in 2016
and 2017, (ii) households who have a debt service to income ratio greater than four, and
(iii) those whose income is negative in general. For the latter case, we trim them as we
do not know whether a negative income itself means that the households are in financial
distress. Regression results without trimming are very similar to those with trimming. In
any case, trimming (marginally) downward biases our results.
In our trimmed sample, the average respondent is 57 years old, female, the spouse of
the household head, and has 5.7 years of education. Our financial literacy score indicates
a relatively low level of financial literacy. On average, respondents answered four out of
seven knowledge questions correctly, reached five out of nine possible points concerning
financial behavior, and three out of seven possible points with regard to financial atti-
tude. This is in line with findings from the OECD/INFE study for Thailand from 2016
(OECD, 2016). While 57.27% of our respondents are the sole financial decision makers in
their households, 28.05% share this task with someone else. Hence, when sometimes using
respondent- and not household-specific characteristics or perceptions in the analysis, we
are still confident that these individual traits determine the household’s state of indebt-
edness because the majority of respondents is in charge of making financial decisions.5
2.2 The Thai Rural Credit Market
In Thailand, over 80% of the population has a bank account and over 60% uses it for digital
payments. The gaps in financial inclusion between women and men as well as between the
rural and urban population have declined and are now relatively small (Demirguc-Kunt et
al., 2018). Financial inclusion in our sample is similar: 78.34% of our sample households
have an account with a formal banking institution.
Simultaneously, the rural credit market has evolved extensively, providing manifold
loan options for consumers. This is mainly due to heavily subsidized government pro-
grams. The market is dominated by government-financed institutions (Chichaibelu and
Waibel, 2017). The most important ones are the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural
Cooperatives (BAAC) and the Village and Urban Community Fund (VF) program,6 with
the former reaching approximately 95% of all farm households (Terada and Vandenberg,
2014). This massive expansion can also be observed in our sample, where the majority
4 Our main questionnaire can be downloaded here.
5 Still, as a robustness check, we re-run the analysis without respondents who are not at all in charge of
financial decision-making within the household.
6 The aim of the VF is to improve financial access in rural areas in Thailand. It is one of the largest
microfinance programs in the world (Menkho↵ and Rungruxsirivorn, 2011).
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(73.4%) of households has a loan that is either still owed or has been paid back within
the last 12 months. Figure 3 provides a graphic overview of the loan situation. Condi-
tional on having a loan, households have on average 2.4 loans. Households borrow from
formal and informal sources alike. In fact, loan sources are diverse, with the two most
important credit sources being the BAAC and the VF. This lending pattern is similar
across all districts we consider. Households also borrow from other sources, for example,
from agricultural cooperatives, business partners, money lenders, relatives, and friends.
Loans are taken out for various reasons. Most loans are primarily used for agricultural
related goods like fertilizer or pesticides (23.96%), for consumption goods (22.39%), and
for agricultural investments, e.g. farm land or agricultural machines (16.58%). Loans are
also used for paying back another loan (9.87%), buying durable household goods (6.72%),
and for education (3.15%).
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Figure 3: Number of Loans
2.3 Income Expectations
Households can form positive or negative income expectations. We are interested in
studying households that exhibit high (positive) income expectations. In order to obtain a
positive income expectation measure, we must elicit income expectations in the first place.
Expectations play a central role in the economic theory of household decision-making, for
example, with respect to determining saving, borrowing, and consumption (Friedman,
1957), or with respect to occupation choices (Becker, 1964). Manifold research has tried
to predict this choice behavior based on expectations. Yet, expectations are challenging
to elicit empirically.
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2.3.1 Eliciting Income Expectations
Expectations from Former Income Realizations The traditional way of elicitation -
referred to as revealed preference analysis - assumes that individuals have rational expec-
tations (Dominitz and Manski, 1997; Manski, 2004) and infers expectations from data
on past income realizations. For this approach, strong assumptions on the expectation
formations process are needed, with both the researcher and the respondent needing to
have the same information set (Guiso et al., 2002). Given these strong assumptions and
our conjecture that mistakes in expectation formation are likely to occur in our setting,
we decide for two alternative elicitation methods, which are explained in what follows.
Qualitative Expectations Questions The first way is to elicit expectations via quali-
tative questions, e.g. using Likert scales for questions on future expected events. We use
this method in the appendix to replicate the results of Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018), who
use Likert scales to elicit financial expectations. However, this approach su↵ers from two
main drawbacks: First, answers might not be comparable across respondents and, second,
response options may be too coarse and leave room for responses di↵erent from what is
proposed.
Subjective Probabilistic Income Expectations Dominitz and Manski (1997) suggest to
elicit probabilistic expectations. This approach is particularly useful for calculating indi-
vidual cumulative distribution functions and moments of the relevant variable (Attanasio,
2009). By allowing researchers to retrieve di↵erent moments of the expected income dis-
tribution, it becomes possible to algebraically study the internal consistency of elicited
expectations (e.g. apply the laws of probability) and to use these probabilistic expecta-
tions as actual probabilities describing how respondents assess future outcomes. We use
this approach in our main analysis to retrieve positive expectations.
As we elicit expectations within a rural sample in an emerging economy, we rephrase
percent change questions in a way similar to “how sure are you” and use visual aids to
make the concept of probability more comprehensible.7 Thereby, we address the concerns
of Attanasio (2009) and Delavande et al. (2011), who state that the concept of probability
might be hard to convey in contexts where people have low levels of education.8
To check whether respondents adhere to the basic laws of probability, we first ask
7 Studies dealing with these kind of expectation elicitation include, among others, Attanasio and Augs-
burg (2016), who study income processes in India, McKenzie et al. (2013), who investigate income
expectations of Tongans, and Attanasio and Kaufmann (2014), who elicit income expectations among
high school students in Mexico.
8 The average respondent in our sample only attended school for six years.
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them how sure they are that it will rain tomorrow and how sure they are that it will
rain within the next two weeks. They can indicate their answer by putting between zero
and ten marbles that we gave them beforehand into a cup, with zero marbles meaning
they are absolutely sure it will not rain and ten marbles meaning they are absolutely sure
it will rain. There are 182 out of 748 respondents (24.33 %) who do not obey the laws
of probability: they set a zero chance that it will rain within the next two weeks but a
positive probability that it will rain tomorrow. This is a substantial share of respondents,
most likely caused by the low educational level in our sample. In the subsequent analysis,
we run our regression both with and without these individuals.
After this “warm-up” exercise, we ask respondents how sure they are that their
monthly household income in the next twelve months will be in a predefined range. We
use income quartiles from the 2013 TVSEP wave to predetermine the four bins to which
respondents allocate their ten marbles. The four bins range between 0 - 3,300 Thai Baht
(THB), 3,300 - 8,100 THB, 8,100 - 16,590 THB, and 16,590 - 921,000 THB.9 Respondents
distribute their ten marbles based on how likely they think it is that their future monthly
income will lie in each specific bin.10 Hence, we are able to calculate the individual cumu-
lative distribution function (CDF) for the expected monthly income as we interpret the
number of marbles distributed between the cups as points on their individual CDFs.
We then fit a subjective income distribution following Attanasio and Augsburg (2016)
and assume a piecewise (i.e. per cup) uniform probability distribution. This enables us to
calculate a specific expected mean and median income, as well as the standard deviation,
for each household.
Table 1: Probabilities Assigned to Sections of the Income Distribution
Observations Minimum Maximum Median Mean S.D.
0-3300 THB 737 0 100 20 32.18 35.1
3301-8100 THB 737 0 100 30 30.71 29.27
8101-16590 737 0 100 20 24.03 28.38
16591-300000 737 0 100 0 13.08 24.08
Respondents allocate the number of marbles to the cups as a function of their un-
derlying subjective probability to earn income in the specific income range. The average
distribution of marbles per cup, i.e. the average implied probabilities to earn income in
9 The range of the last bin is very broad. Compared to the maximum monthly income respondents state,
we find that only two respondents expect an income as high as 921,000 THB. All other maximum income
guesses range between 0 - 300,000 THB. In order to avoid artificially high expected median incomes,
we restrict the range of the last bin in our calculation of expected median income to a maximum of
300,000 THB.
10The enumerator places four cups in front of them, each labelled with a di↵erent income range and
makes sure that all marbles are allocated at the end of the exercise.
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the respective income quartile is shown in Table 1. Additionally, Figure 4 presents the
probability density function of expected income in our sample. The average respondent’s
expected income distribution is skewed to the right; that is, on average, respondents
believe it is more probable that their average monthly future income is in the lower cups.
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Figure 4: Probability Density Function of Expected Income
We also ensure that the elicited expected income is not completely at odds with the
actual income process. As measure for the income process, we use the realized income
in 2016 and a measure averaging the self-reported income in a very bad and a very good
month. Correlations between these and our expected income measure are always statis-
tically significant and range between 0.27 and 0.33, which is encouragingly high given
that the correlation between actual income in 2016 and 2017 is 0.48. Furthermore, as
Attanasio (2009) proposes, we check how the subjective expected median income covaries
with household characteristics, particularly with the composition, education, and realized
income (results available upon request). Beyond the already stated relationship with in-
come, household total education is significantly, positively related to the expected median
income. A little ambiguous is the correlation to household composition: While a larger
number of elders in the household is associated with lower expected income (albeit not
significantly), more workers in the household also seem to decrease it.11
11Reflecting on this last result, we assume that households with more working members are, in general,
poorer and have less stable incomes. There is a tendency in Thailand to abolish multi-generational
households for small family homes, which is, however, only possible if income is high enough and stable.
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2.3.2 Defining Positive Income Expectations
We develop a new kind of positive income expectation measure that is based on the
expected future monthly income and the current income. To derive a quantitative income
forecast (Quant. IF), we first calculate the percentage change between actual monthly
income generated in t and future expected monthly income in t + 1, which is elicited by
the procedure explained in Section 2.3.1. Specifically, t refers to the year 2017, for which
we have actual income data. Consequently, t+ 1 considers income expectations for 2018.
Quantitative Income Forecast (Quant. IF ) =
Et(Inci,t+1)  Inci,t
Inci,t
⇥ 100 (1)
In a second step, we divide the quantitative income forecast into quintiles such that
our outcome measure allows for five categories ranging from a very negative, negative,
mildly negative income forecast, via a neutral income forecast to a positive quantitative
income forecast. Thus, the negative (positive) forecasts capture households that expect
relatively less (more) future monthly income as compared to their actual earned income
in the current year. Each quintile enters the regression via a dummy variable where
households with a mildly negative quantitative income forecast (i.e. respondents that
range in the third quintile) serve as the omitted group.
In general, respondents are rather pessimistic with regard to their future income. The
distribution of changes in expected future income ranges from -98.6% to 19528.6% whereas
the maximum is a clear outlier, which also drives the average increase of expected future
income of about 35%. If we exclude this household the average shrinks to 6.9%.12 The
median household expects a 51% decrease of future income relative to actual income.
Thus, the distribution is skewed to the right. In total, 75% of the sample expect their
future income to be lower than the one in the year of the survey. This explains why three
of the quintiles clearly range in the negative scope of the distribution and are thus coined
“negative income forecast.” Only the highest quintile is composed of households that have
a clearly positive outlook.13 The negative outlook on future income may be explained by
two developments: First, respondents may fear further political turmoil following the
2014 military coup. Second, the negative outlook may be due to the persistent, regional,
economic inequality. People from north eastern Thailand still earn substantially less than
people from other regions and, thus, might feel disadvantaged throughout (Lao et al.,
2019). According to the World Bank, inequality in Thailand has increased between 2015
and 2017, despite overall economic growth in the country (World Bank, 2019).
12The corresponding respondent has a very low income in 2017, but - in the cup game - used all ten balls
for the highest income range. We suspect the respondent had not fully grasped the elicitation game.
13Variables that covary with each respective forecast group can be found in Online Appendix I.
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While we cannot formally test accuracy of expectations with our subjective expected
income data,14 we assume that a high and positive relative di↵erence between expected
income in 2018 and realized income in 2017 is partly due to respondents being too opti-
mistic regarding what they will earn in the future. This assumption is based on studies
finding that expectations about various future outcomes may tend toward being positively
biased (see for example Zinman, 2015). Furthermore, considering the median household’s
negative expectation on future monthly income, we are confident that we capture very
optimistic households with regard to income development in the highest quintile of the
distribution.
We also account for perceived income uncertainty in our analysis. In addition to asking
respondents how they think that their income will develop over the next 12 months, we
ask how certain they are that this income development will truly become reality. Being
potentially too certain about future realizations of stochastic processes can be a form of
biased expectation called “overprecision” (Moore and Healy, 2008).
Figure 5 provides a graphic overview of the results on our measure for perceived income
certainty: 55.56% of respondents are at least somewhat certain about their income devel-
opment and 28.44% are very certain. The survey took place during the harvest season, so
that respondents might have an idea about the harvest outcome and, therefore, perceive
their expected future income as rather certain or they truly su↵er from overprecision.
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Figure 5: Income Certainty
Last, we derive a measure of expectation accuracy following Souleles (2004) and Hyyti-
nen and Putkuri (2018). It is based on a coarser assessment of a household’s future income.
14 For example, because we lack data about realized income in 2018, the year after we asked for expected
income, and we do not know (yet) about shocks households endured during that time.
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We can actually determine its accuracy, which is why we call this measure the qualitative
forecast error. The derivation and estimation results are found in Appendix B.
2.4 Over-indebtedness Indicators
There is no consensus regarding a single set of indicators measuring indebtedness precisely,
even less so for over-indebtedness.15 In general, all measures share economic, social,
temporal, and psychological dimensions such as that the amount of debt exceeds income
over a medium- to long-term time horizon and the household is not able to fulfill its debt
commitments without increasing its income or lowering its standard of living, which might
lead to stress and worry (D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013). Furthermore, so-called objective
debt measures relate to the household’s debt service capacity, subjective measures rather
emphasize the psychological consequences of being indebted (Keese, 2012).
Based on the existing literature, we decide to construct two measures of over-indebtedness.
The first index captures di↵erent dimensions of being “objectively” over-indebted (based
on best practices from the literature) while the second index rather refers to “subjectively”
felt factors related to financial distress.
Objective Over-Indebtedness Index The objective over-indebtedness measure is
an aggregated and standardized index that combines four indicators. We include the
following components in the index: an indicator variable if the debt service to income
ratio (DSR) is greater than 0.4, an indicator variable if the overall remaining debt service
to income ratio exceeds 0.4, an indicator for if the household holds more than two loans
at the same time, and one indicator for if the household paid late or defaulted on a loan in
the last 12 months. Each component is well established in the literature (see, for example
D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013). Among these variables, the DSR is widely recognized as
standard measure to capture indebtedness. The threshold we set for the DSR to indicate
over-indebtedness is based on considerations from the literature where a range between 0.3
and 0.5 is used (Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017; D’Alessio and Iezzi, 2013). In constructing
the objective over-indebtedness index we follow Kling et al. (2007). We explain how the
index and its components are derived in Online Appendix II. When deriving our debt
measures, we include all types of loans that households report. Those can be formal
or informal loans, as well as loans taken from friends and family members. During the
interview, respondents were highly encouraged to report all loans regardless of the source.
Hence, we are confident that we capture a household’s true debt level.
Subjective Over-Indebtedness Index While objective debt indicators provide nu-
merically accurate debt measures, they are sometimes criticized for failing to account
15Among others, D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) provide a summary on di↵erent indebtedness indicators, their
usage, and possible drawbacks.
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either for the reasons why households overborrow or for the household’s undisclosed
ability to pay back debt. Therefore, we also include subjective, “respondent driven”
over-indebtedness measures in our analysis. As before, we derive a standardized index
aggregating di↵erent indicators of subjective over-indebtedness. The indicators include
an assessment identifying if the household feels it has too much debt, if it has di culties
paying debt o↵, and the so-called “sacrifice index.”16 The index and its components are
explained in detail in Online Appendix II. Schicks (2013) prefers to use subjective over ob-
jective debt measures in her work analyzing over-indebtedness from a customer-protection
point of view in microfinance. D’Alessio and Iezzi (2013) also rely heavily on a subjective
measure to study over-indebtedness in Italy. In line with Keese (2012) and Lusardi and
Tufano (2015), we argue that subjective measures describe a situation of financial distress
for the respective households but are, naturally, highly subjective to the respondent such
that these measures should not be used without considering objective indicators as well.
For all indices derived, higher scores point at a higher value of accumulated debt.
Table 2 depicts the summary statistics of the objective and subjective over-indebtedness
indices. The objective index ranges from -1 to 3 with higher values indicating a more se-
vere level of over-indebtedness. While the average DSR lies at 0.23, about 18% of the
households have a DSR that is higher than 0.4. More strikingly, about 23% of our sample
households have more than two loans. The range of the subjective index is between -2
and 3, again oriented in a way that higher numbers point to higher indebtedness. On
average, households state that they have the “right amount of debt” (Mean = -0.02 for
the debt position variable) and that they have no di culties paying o↵ debt. However,
the average household admits to have made at least some sacrifices regarding household
needs due to lack of money as the average value is -0.08 and a household with no sacrifices
would be found at the lowest end of the sacrifice index distribution.
Furthermore, Table A.1 presents correlations between all our debt indicators. Natu-
rally, the objective and subjective indices are significantly correlated with their respective
sub-indicators. However, our objective and subjective measures also correlate significantly
with each other. This is encouraging, since it rebuts criticism with respect to objective
over-indebtedness measures neglecting important dimensions of financial distress.
16We closely follow Schicks (2013) in constructing the sacrifice index.
14
Table 2: Summary Statistics - Over-Indebtedness Variables
Mean S.D. Min Max Observ.
Objective Index 0.00 0.99 -1 3 688
DSR > 0.4 (=1) 0.18 0.39 0 1 688
Holds > 2 Loans (=1) 0.23 0.42 0 1 688
RDSR > 0.4 (=1) 0.40 0.49 0 1 688
Paid Late/Default (=1) 0.15 0.36 0 1 685
Subjective Index -0.02 0.98 -1 4 688
Debt Position -0.02 0.86 -1 1 688
Di↵. Paying Debt (=1) 0.06 0.25 0 1 686
Sacrifice Index -0.08 1.19 -2 4 688
Note: The debt index variables are standardized. The components of the indices are given in non-standardized real terms.
3 Survey Results
In the following, we relate the quantitative income forecast to the over-indebtedness in-
dices by running OLS regressions, estimating correlations between the respective variables.
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The regressions we run take the following form:
Over-Indebtedness Indexi =  0 +  1Quant. IFi +X
0
i 2 + ✏i (2)
The dependent variable Over-Indebtedness Indexi represents the debt measures we
apply to mirror financial distress of the household. It contains either the objective over-
indebtedness index,17 or the subjective over-indebtedness index.18 The main variables of
interests are captured in Quant.IFi. It comprises the income forecast groups (quantitative
income forecast) we derived in Section 2.3, where the mildly negative forecast group serves
as reference group. We cluster our standard errors at the district level.19
The vector Xi controls for household and respondent characteristics that are likely
to influence household over-indebtedness: dummies for farming, self-employment, and
17 Standardized average of a dummy equaling one if the debt service to income ratio is greater than 0.4,
a dummy equaling one if the remaining debt to income ratio is greater than 0.4, a dummy regarding
whether the household paid late or defaulted on a loan, and a dummy equaling one if the household
has more than two loans.
18 Standardized average of the sacrifice index, answers to questions on debt position and whether the
household has di culties paying o↵ debt.
19Cameron and Miller (2015) advise to cluster at least at the primary sampling unit, which is the district
level in our case. Since this gives us a small number of clusters, as a robustness check, we use wild
cluster bootstrap. This does not change our main findings.
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wage employment, monthly household income in 2016 and 2017, the number of children
between the age of 0-6, 7-10, and 11-16 years, the number of elders and working members,
total household education (sum of all educational levels in the hh), age and age squared
of the respondent, and respondent’s financial literacy score. The vector also captures the
monetary loss from past shocks. We use detailed information from 2016 and 2017 about
monetary losses directly related to a shock. We di↵erentiate between losses from farming
related shocks, environmental shocks, economic shocks, crime shocks, and other shocks.
3.2 Main Results
To begin with, we relate the quantitative income forecast groups to each over-indebtedness
index (OI-Index). In a second step, we add the aforementioned control variables to our
regression as the indices depend on other respondent and household specific characteristics
as well. Tables 3 and 4 provide results for the objective and subjective OI-Indices. The
tables show results for the four income forecast groups as well as for the shock loss
control variables. Tables presenting results for all covariates included in the regression
analysis are presented in Online Appendix I. The first column in each table represents
the standardized and averaged index whereas the subsequent columns depict results for
the single non-standardized components of the indices.
Objective Over-Indebtedness We find a strong, statistically significant, relationship
between positive income forecasts and the objective OI-Index. Households with high
future income expectations compared to their actual income are more likely to be over-
indebted. The over-indebtedness index increases by 0.29 - 0.31 points for positive income
expectations (columns (1) and (2), Table 3). This relationship is mainly driven by the
remaining debt ratio and the dummy on if the household paid late or defaulted on a
loan. The debt service to income ratio is only marginally significantly related to positive
expectations and having more than two loans shows no relation at all. The RDSR increases
by 18.7 - 20.7 percentage points (columns (5) and (6)) and the probability that a household
paid late or defaulted on a loan increases by 10.9 - 12.4 percentage points for households
whose expected future median income is greater than the current income (columns (7)
and (8)). Furthermore, the coe cient of the dummy indicating a DSR greater than 0.4
increases by 8.4 - 9.8 percentage points (columns (3) and (4)) for those households.
With regard to the other income forecast groups, we do not find consistent results.
While the probability of a household defaulting or paying late slightly increases for house-
holds with a negative forecast, overall, results for the non-positive income forecast groups
are insignificant, if not showing a negative sign. A significant and robust link to over-
indebtedness can only be found for households with positive future income expectations.
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Table 3: Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very Negative –0.125 –0.017 –0.097* –0.022 –0.073 0.011 0.017 –0.015 0.001 0.010
(0.151) (0.143) (0.047) (0.050) (0.081) (0.079) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.060)
Negative 0.050 0.058 –0.067 –0.054 0.075 0.100* 0.081** 0.066** –0.029 –0.037
(0.134) (0.132) (0.045) (0.048) (0.058) (0.057) (0.032) (0.029) (0.057) (0.058)
Neutral 0.153 0.135 0.025 0.002 0.079 0.067 0.074 0.095* –0.002 –0.010
(0.153) (0.168) (0.050) (0.060) (0.058) (0.064) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061) (0.063)
Positive 0.289** 0.333** 0.098** 0.087* 0.187** 0.210*** 0.109*** 0.133*** –0.054 –0.037
(0.134) (0.136) (0.042) (0.047) (0.072) (0.069) (0.038) (0.041) (0.055) (0.060)
Farming Shocks –0.000 –0.000 0.000 –0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Environ. Shocks 0.005*** –0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Shocks 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks –0.016* –0.004* –0.013*** –0.002 –0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Shocks –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000** –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –0.073 –1.425** 0.189*** 0.119 0.343***–0.617** 0.099*** –0.016 0.245***–0.291
(0.144) (0.576) (0.048) (0.296) (0.072) (0.286) (0.019) (0.243) (0.063) (0.280)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.014 0.099 0.025 0.046 0.025 0.125 0.007 0.044 -0.003 0.053
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Households with a
mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children
(11-16), financial literacy score, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly
household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
We account for monetary losses from various shock events, because a shock might
influence both the level of over-indebtedness and income expectations at the same time
(i.e. an expectation to return to pre-shock-level income). The results show that higher
losses are associated with higher debt levels. However, while we find statistically signifi-
cant e↵ects, these e↵ects are economically rather small. For example, if an environmental
shock loss increases by 1000 Thai Baht (ca. 26e in 2017), the objective OI-Index in-
creases by 0.05 points. Even when accounting for monetary losses induced by shocks,
the relationship between positive income forecasts and over-indebtedness remains signifi-
cant, confirming a robust relationship between the two. Concerning additional covariates,
household income and the perceived social status are significantly negatively related to
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household over-indebtedness. Age is positively and age squared negatively significant,
suggesting a hump-shaped pattern in line with life-cycle-income-smoothing. Furthermore,
over-indebtedness remains largely una↵ected by household composition and education.
Subjective Over-Indebtedness Our analysis of subjective over-indebtedness reveals
that the relationship to the positive income forecast group is less pronounced than for the
objective over-indebtedness index but still significant for the index and all its components.
Table 4: Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very Negative 0.182 0.215* 0.040 0.036 0.065** 0.058 0.118 0.245**
(0.112) (0.122) (0.114) (0.110) (0.029) (0.039) (0.106) (0.103)
Negative 0.157 0.150 0.096 0.046 0.037 0.033 0.108 0.178
(0.135) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.025) (0.026) (0.174) (0.154)
Neutral –0.007 0.048 –0.021 0.008 0.022 0.031 –0.098 –0.035
(0.104) (0.092) (0.096) (0.094) (0.021) (0.019) (0.128) (0.095)
Positive 0.144 0.258** 0.113 0.181** 0.024 0.041* 0.113 0.245*
(0.086) (0.101) (0.071) (0.084) (0.021) (0.023) (0.120) (0.122)
Farming Shocks –0.001 0.002 –0.000* –0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Environmental Shocks 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.001 0.003** –0.000 –0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Crime Shocks 0.000 –0.006 0.003 –0.005
(0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014)
Other Shocks 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –0.115 –0.482 –0.064 –1.480***0.035** 0.140 –0.131 0.344
(0.082) (0.593) (0.081) (0.514) (0.016) (0.155) (0.111) (0.591)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.133 -0.002 0.094 0.002 0.073 -0.001 0.119
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, main income farming, main income employed, main
income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working
members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
As shown in Appendix B, the qualitative forecast error is more strongly related to
the subjective OI-Index. This hints at two possible explanations: One, the subjective
OI-Index is rather a concept of perceived financial distress and, thus, more related to the
“more subjective” qualitative forecast error. Two, financial distress is not only determined
by the household’s true debt situation but more so by its perception. When analyzing the
control variables, we find that risk seeking and the perceived social status of the household
are highly significantly related to the subjective OI-Index, much more so than other control
variables. Delving deeper into respondent characteristics, we run regressions including the
Big Five measures,20 (results are presented in Online Appendix I). For respondents who
score high on openness and neuroticism, the subjective OI-Index and its components are
larger than for those who score low. Eventually, shocks are similarly related to subjective
over-indebtedness as they are to objective over-indebtedness: Households experiencing an
environmental shock have a significantly higher perceived debt level.
Income Certainty In an additional exercise, we investigate whether being potentially
too certain about the future income development is related to over-indebtedness.
Table 5: Certainty Measure - Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Negative –0.017 –0.023 0.012 –0.017 0.013
(0.144) (0.050) (0.079) (0.036) (0.061)
Negative 0.047 –0.062 0.104* 0.057* –0.034
(0.129) (0.044) (0.054) (0.030) (0.057)
Neutral 0.122 –0.002 0.062 0.092* –0.013
(0.167) (0.060) (0.064) (0.051) (0.063)
Positive 0.323** 0.084 0.201*** 0.131*** –0.037
(0.140) (0.051) (0.070) (0.043) (0.061)
Certainty 0.129** 0.052** 0.046* –0.008 0.061**
(0.061) (0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.022)
Constant –1.564** 0.074 –0.705** 0.064 –0.413
(0.552) (0.299) (0.284) (0.268) (0.276)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 664 661 664
Adj. R-squared 0.101 0.054 0.125 0.042 0.060
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
20The Big Five comprise the following personality traits: openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agree-
ableness, and neuroticism. More details on their construction are found in Online Appendix II.
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As shown in Tables 5 and 6, there is no relation between certainty about future income
and subjective over-indebtedness, although we find that higher income certainty is related
to objective over-indebtedness. If a respondent is very certain about the development of
future household income, this is linked to an augmented over-indebtedness index. This
result is mainly driven by the debt to service ratio and by having more than two loans
(columns (2) and (5), Table 5). Thus, certainty is likely to constitute a part of the positive
forecast we derived.
Table 6: Certainty Measure - Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Negative 0.220 0.049 0.057 0.247**
(0.133) (0.117) (0.041) (0.108)
Negative 0.144 0.045 0.032 0.168
(0.109) (0.108) (0.026) (0.150)
Neutral 0.043 0.010 0.030 –0.048
(0.092) (0.095) (0.019) (0.097)
Positive 0.238** 0.177* 0.035 0.227*
(0.110) (0.098) (0.023) (0.125)
Certainty 0.069 0.092 0.006 0.031
(0.086) (0.066) (0.020) (0.104)
Constant –0.673 –1.802*** 0.143 0.273
(0.651) (0.578) (0.165) (0.699)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 662 664
Adj. R-squared 0.133 0.098 0.072 0.115
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Overall, we conclude, (i) that there is indeed a significant positive and robust relation-
ship between positive quantitative income forecasts and objective as well as subjective
over-indebtedness; (ii) We are also reassured that, although correlated to each other,
subjective and objective over-indebtedness indicators measure di↵erent dimensions of in-
debtedness. The “hard” objective OI-Index is much stronger related to positive income
forecasts than the subjective OI-Index; (iii) Certainty about the household’s income de-
velopment is also related to over-indebtedness, primarily to objective over-indebtedness.
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3.3 Robustness
Excluding Possibly Confounding Observations. Before eliciting the subjective expected
income of respondents, we ask two questions testing the understanding of the concept of
probability. We re-run the analysis including only those respondents who do not violate
the laws of probability and examine whether our main results hold. Results are presented
in Tables A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. The coe cients for this sub-sample stay highly
significant and almost all coe cients increase in size emphasizing the link between a
positive income forecast and objective over-indebtedness.
In order to verify that respondents have an actual understanding of their household’s
finances, we again re-run the regressions, including only those individuals who are in
charge of the household’s financial decisions either alone or together with someone else
(see Tables A.4 and A.5). Overall, the results stay virtually unchanged with regard to
the significance of our coe cients of interest. Point estimates change slightly.
Interacting the Income Forecast with Personality Traits. We do not claim to show a
causal e↵ect because - among other reasons - we acknowledge that the relation between
over-indebtedness and positive income expectations may also work in the reverse. For
example, if people are indebted, they might have a great bias regarding future expected
income as they plan to work harder in the future to pay down their debt. We expect
such people to exhibit a high level of conscientiousness, the personality marker describing
achievement oriented (McClelland et al., 1953), hard-working, e↵ective, and dutiful char-
acters (Barrick and Mount, 1991). Hence, we interact our income forecast measure with
this character trait, expecting to find significant e↵ects for conscientious people. Results
for the aggregated indices as dependent variables are presented in Table A.6. The inter-
action is not significant for the positive income forecast and any of the OI-Indices. This
counteracts the assumption that the achieving respondents with distorted expectations
drive the relationship between our positive income forecast and debt status. Hence, the
results from the interaction show that reverse causality issues are highly unlikely.
Exchanging the Forecast Dummies with One Single “Bias” Indicator. We apply a
coarser indicator measuring positive future income expectations to counteract the possible
criticism that our results hinge on the choice of the reference category with respect to our
income forecast groups. In lieu of the five quantitative income forecast groups, we define
an indicator variable to turn one if the relative di↵erence between expected future and
actual income is greater than zero.
Results for the objective and subjective over-indebtedness indices as well as for the
certainty measure are presented in Tables A.7, A.8, A.9, and A.10. Probably due to the
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broader category that we use as the main explanatory variable, point estimates gain in
significance, but are numerically a little smaller when compared to the positive quanti-
tative or qualitative income forecast groups. This actually supports our finding that it
is exactly those respondents with high expectations about their future income who are
also relatively more indebted. Generally, this robustness check confirms that our results
remain significant and similar in size with respect to the objective and subjective over-
indebtedness indicators when using a broader income expectation indicator. Hence, it is
not the choice of the reference group that drives our results.21
4 The Experiment
The preceding section shows that high expectations and over-indebtedness are strongly
related to each other in our rural Thai population, even when controlling for important
socio-economic characteristics and shocks. However, methodologically, the implemented
regression analysis only represents correlations. Furthermore, we are specifically inter-
ested whether overconfidence, a systematic behavioral bias that might be responsible
for having too high expectations in the first place, can actually cause overspending and
overborrowing. In what follows, we analyze if overconfidence is one potential cause why
households in our sample spend more than they can actually a↵ord.
Theoretically, upward biased expectations can arise for two reasons; either an indi-
vidual is overly optimistic or overly confident. We follow Heger and Papageorge (2018)
in defining overoptimism as the tendency to overestimate the probability of preferred
outcomes and overconfidence as the tendency to overestimate one’s own performance.
We acknowledge that in our rural, agricultural setting, overoptimism might occur as fre-
quently if not more than overconfidence. Since agricultural activities and the exposure to
weather shocks are rather homogeneous in our sample and less driven by personal abilities,
a more positive view on the future might originate from an optimistic view on the world
in general. Still, there is scope for overconfidence as the adoption of new agricultural
technologies and crops, the working pace (that can influence agricultural output) and
the bargaining power in selling crops is strongly dependent on beliefs about individual
performance and might lead to positive income expectations as well. For our experiment,
we concentrate on overconfidence because numerous studies show that overconfidence is
related to important life and financial decisions, while overoptimism is less so.22
21Additionally, we also used di↵erent reference groups in the first place and our regression results remain
similar. Results are available upon request.
22 For example, Camerer and Lovallo (1999), who experimentally test the e↵ect of overconfidence on
entrepreneurial decision-making (this relationship is a well-researched field of study), conclude that
excess entry in a market game is strongly related to overconfidence and not to overoptimism.
4.1 Experimental Design
As final part of the survey, we play a market game in which respondents can buy di↵erent
kinds of goods for a discounted price with money they earn in the experiment. They can
buy packs of co↵ee, chips, dried mango, or detergent for 10 THB (ca. 0.25e) each instead
of the 20 THB list price.23 Each participant receives an endowment of 40 THB. Additional
money can be earned by answering questions in a trivia game. Earnings depend on how
many questions the participant answers correctly in comparison to the other participants.
We rank them from 1-10, where rank ten corresponds to answering the most questions
correctly and rank one to answering the least number of questions correctly.24 People
ranked 1-4 do not earn anything on top of their endowment, those ranked 5-6 earn 10
THB, those ranked 7-8 20 THB, and those ranked 9-10 earn 40 THB additionally. Thus,
participants can earn up to 80 THB and can buy at most eight goods.
We make expectations a crucial factor in the game by requiring participants to decide
how much and what to buy before they take the pay-o↵ relevant quiz, i.e. before they
know their final payo↵. We divide participants in two treatment groups; one group faces a
“hard” quiz and the other one an “easy” trivia quiz. To convey the di culty of each quiz
and to exogenously vary expectations about relative performance, participants do a test
quiz with seven questions upfront where di culty again depends on treatment. Based on
the test quiz, participants infer how good they will be in the pay-o↵ relevant main quiz
and form expectations about the performance of the others and, thereby, their relative
rank. They are ranked within each treatment group and they are told that everybody
they are ranked against took the exact the same quiz. With this design, we can exploit the
so-called hard-easy gap analogous to Dargnies et al. (2019) and very similar to Grohmann
et al. (2019). Much research finds that people tend to overplace themselves in easy
tasks and to underplace themselves in hard tasks (for example Merkle and Weber, 2011;
Hartwig and Dunlosky, 2014; Benoit et al., 2015). Over-(under-)placing is a form of over-
(under-)confidence in which individuals over-(under-)estimate their relative performance
in comparison to others. Thus, by assigning participants to two di↵erent treatments, we
23At least for the bag of chips, it is common knowledge that they usually cost 20 THB as, for a long
time, they had the price printed on their front. To further convince participants that the products are
truly discounted, we attached “20 THB” price tags to each product.
24 In the field, participants from the first villages were ranked against participants from our pilot villages
and our interviewers who also took the quizzes. For later villages, we replaced our interviewer data
with data from the previous villages and told participants that they are ranked against ten persons
who live in a village similar to theirs. For the final analysis, we use all the observations to create a
ranking. In each treatment, we have two accumulation points in the number of correctly answered
questions that are next to each other and around the mean. We set these two points as rank five and
six. Each one point deviation in correctly answered question then constitutes a one point deviation
in rank (e.g. if rank five means nine questions answered correctly, rank four means eight questions
answered correctly). Since there are more questions than possible ranks, we have some bunching of
correctly answered questions around rank one and rank ten, the boundaries of the ranking.
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exogenously vary their expectations through varying self-confidence (see Figure 6).25 We
subsequently measure confidence as the di↵erence between expected rank and actual rank:
confidence = rankexp   rankact (3)
1. Round:
Test quiz
Prime self confidence
Consumption
decision using
expectations
2. Round:
Payo↵
relevant quiz
Consumption
decision
realized
Figure 6: Experimental Flow
Except for the di↵erence in di culty, the procedure is the same for every participant:
If participants agree to play the game, the interviewer prepares the set-up and starts read-
ing the instructions. The instructions include comprehension questions to test whether
participants understand how their rank is determined and how much they can earn. If
participants do not answer these questions correctly, the interviewer does not continue
with the instructions.26 After they have finished the instructions, the participants start
answering the test quiz, which has seven trivia questions. They have five minutes to
answer all the questions. For each question, four possible answers are given. When the
time is up or participants have finished answering, they receive a decision sheet. On the
decision sheet, they first have to write down the rank and the earnings they expect to
reach in the following main quiz. Then, they must indicate their buying decision based
on their expected earnings. Afterwards, participants continue with the main quiz where
they have to answer 15 questions in ten minutes. Following the quiz, there are three
debriefing questions including a question on the expected rank after the second quiz has
actually taken place (such that we can check for belief updating). Finally, the interviewer
calculates the rank and earnings, then hands over the products and money, if applicable.
In most cases, participants could read, write, and answer the quizzes on their own.
Sometimes, people, in particular the elderly, needed assistance in reading and writing,
25The exogenous variation is one reason why we do not include this measure for self-confidence in our
survey regressions as a measure for expectation bias. Another reason is that self-confidence is domain
dependent.
26 Still, there are participants who had serious di culties in understanding the game such that we exclude
them from the main analysis
24
which was provided by the interviewer. The supplemental material for the experiment is
found in Online Appendix III in English (for the experiment everything was translated
to Thai).
Rational Decisions
If participants want to buy more than they can a↵ord, including their endowment, their
consumption has to be restricted. They receive at most as many goods as they can buy
with their earnings and nothing beyond that amount. Participants are aware of this fact.
We implicitly assume that expectations influence buying decisions. If this does not
hold, the aforementioned design feature seriously distorts our results as follows. If it
was the case that “rational” participants strictly prefer goods over money because, for
example, they are cheaper than list price and can be stockpiled, expectations would
become meaningless for the consumption decision. Indicating to buy eight goods is weakly
dominating any other number of goods for this kind of participants, since they clearly
prefer goods over money independent of the budget.27
Eventually about 4% of our participants decided to buy eight goods even though they
expect to earn less. An additional 3% wanted to buy more than they expected to earn
but less than eight goods. In our main analysis, these observations are excluded because
i) we already know that expectations do not impact consumption in this setting for them
and ii) they could artificially inflate our results. We present additional analyses on this
sub-sample in the Appendix Section “The Rationals” (C.4) and discuss whether they
truly acted in a rational way or rather had di culties understanding the game.
For the other 93%, we still assume that respondents generally prefer a bundle of
products and cash. The exact composition depends on individual preferences but also
expected earnings. Thus, being overconfident (or underconfident) creates a distortion in
utility. Following these reflections, we derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: On average, individuals in the easy treatment will buy more than indi-
viduals in the hard treatment.
Hypothesis 2: A great level of overconfidence will lead to excessive spending.
Hypothesis 1 is implied by the finding on the hard-easy gap. Hypothesis 2 follows from
the fact that we define respondents to be overconfident if their expected rank is higher than
their actual rank, which implies that they earn less than expected. Since we cannot allow
27 If the participant expects less than 80 THB, there is a potential loss in indicating to buy less than
eight goods because the prediction might be underconfident. However, given our setting, there is no
loss if she indicates buying eight goods but actual earnings are less than 80 THB.
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respondents to pay from personal money if experimental money is insu cient, restricting
consumption in some cases is necessary. Therefore, people cannot accumulate debt. Still,
we try to mimic real life financial decision making with this design, especially the fact
that sometimes (and optimally) consumption decisions must be made before income is
realized. In that sense, participants still have to take a loan, although only for a short
time and without serious consequences, if they want to consume. Further, if they have
biased beliefs, they might end up with a consumption bundle that is sub-optimal, thus
overborrowing. The process can also be seen as a form of household budgeting; however,
we prefer the term overborrowing as participants have to plan with money they do not
have in the moment of planning. In real life those who overborrow accumulate more debt
than optimal, perhaps more than they are able to repay.
4.2 Experimental Results
Overall, 604 respondents participated in the game. Since participation is self-selected,
participants and non-participants are compared in Table C.1 in the Appendix. As can
be seen, participants and non-participants di↵er significantly in some variables.28 In all
these variables, the di↵erence is in the expected direction: female, older, less occupied, less
educated, financial illiterate and less numerate, and more financial risk averse respondents
are less likely to participate in the game. Several of these variables are significantly
correlated with each other. Running a simple regression on the likelihood to participate,
we find that some of these variables are insignificant and that the time of day is one of the
strongest predictors of game participation (see C.2). Since the time of day at which we
visited households for the interviews is mostly exogenous,29 self-selection into the game is
less pronounced than initially expected.
Out of the 604, seven observations are excluded because either treatments for them
are mixed up, personal information is missing, or a third person helped them answer the
questions. We exclude 44 observations that are also excluded from the survey regression
analysis because they are outliers in income or the debt service to income ratio (see Section
2.1).30 Additionally, 84 observations are excluded because it can be inferred from the data
that comprehension was insu cient31 or because they want to buy more than they expect
28A complete list of all variables and their explanation is provided in Online Appendix II.
29We interviewed households according to a schedule we designed together with our interview team
manager, which tried to minimize travel distances for each interview team. Hence, this schedule was
exogenous to individual household characteristics, except for the village that the household resides in.
However, a few houses were empty the first time we visited them and we had to reschedule another
date with the household itself.
30The results are robust to this exclusion.
31 For example, one participant writes that he expects to earn 30 Baht from the game, which is, however,
not an possible option. Another one wants to buy 35 products although the maximum a↵ordable
number is eight.
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to earn in total (see previous Sub-Section on these special cases). Those 84 cases di↵er
only in their number of children between 7-10 years.
In Table 7 characteristics of the remaining 471 participants are compared across treat-
ments. The significantly unequal number of participants per treatment is due to fact that
we slightly over-sampled the easy treatment. Results from previous studies suggest that
the e↵ect of easy tasks on self-confidence is generally stronger than the e↵ect of hard
tasks (see for example Dargnies et al., 2019). The characteristics depicted here might
be important for the general level of self-confidence and the willingness to buy products.
Given the sample size and the number of variables analyzed, randomizing participants into
the treatments worked well; the two groups only significantly di↵er with regard to their
health status, their monthly household income, and their (objective) over-indebtedness
index. Controlling for these variables leaves our results virtually unchanged and a f-test
on joint orthogonality finds that controls do not jointly determine the treatment group.
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics across Treatments
Full Sample Hard Treatment Easy Treatment Di↵erence
Sex 1.64 1.60 1.67  0.07
Age 56.16 55.23 56.93  1.70
Relation to HH Head 1.70 1.69 1.71  0.02
Marital Status 2.13 2.09 2.16  0.07
Main Occupation 4.79 4.29 5.20  0.90
Years of Schooling 5.92 6.08 5.79 0.28
Children (0-6 years) 0.33 0.37 0.29 0.08
Children (7-10 years) 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.01
Numeracy 2.14 2.09 2.19  0.10
Health Status 1.38 1.32 1.43  0.11⇤⇤
BMI 23.58 23.25 23.86  0.61
Fin. Decision Maker 1.57 1.55 1.59  0.03
Self Control 20.94 21.19 20.75 0.44
Risk Taking 4.02 3.96 4.07  0.12
Fin. Risk Taking 4.06 3.99 4.12  0.13
FL-Score 5.66 5.55 5.75  0.20
Monthly Inc. 2017 18653.06 20802.79 16893.44 3909.35⇤⇤
Obj. OI-Index 0.01  0.09 0.09  0.18⇤⇤
Subj. OI-Index  0.04  0.03  0.06 0.03
Morning 0.53 0.51 0.54  0.03
Midday 0.27 0.26 0.28  0.02
Read Alone 1.44 1.44 1.44  0.00
Di culties in Game 1.14 1.15 1.13 0.01
Observations 471 212 259 471
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Shift in Beliefs
On average, participants answered 9.07 out of 15 trivia questions correctly in the easy
treatment and 5.09 out of 15 in the hard treatment. Thus, it can be assumed that, for
our sample, the easy treatment is truly “easier” than the hard treatment. The average
expected rank in the hard treatment is 6.89 whereas the average expected rank in the easy
treatment is 7.22. In Figure 7 the cumulative distribution functions of the expected ranks
for both treatments are plotted. It seems that there is only a small shift in beliefs, since
the distributions are still almost overlapping.32 Indeed, if we compare the distributions
of the “second” expectations that are elicited after respondents actually took the main
quiz, we find a much larger shift (see Appendix Figure C.1). Thus, either our test quizzes
are not as hard or easy as the main quizzes and, therefore, the shift in first beliefs is
smaller or participants have such strong beliefs that they only gradually update their
beliefs. Still, the distributions of first beliefs are significantly di↵erent from each other
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov one-sided p=0.056; Wilcoxon rank-sum two-sided p=0.041). The
t-test for mean expectations is significant at the 5% level (one-sided) as well (Figure 10).
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Figure 7: Cumulative Density Distribution of Expected Rank by Treatment
The di↵erence in self-confidence is larger than the di↵erence in expected rank (see
Figure 8). This might be driven by our ranking procedure or by the fact that the easy
quiz is not a perfect shift of the hard quiz with respect to the number of questions answered
correctly. In any case, this suggests that our manipulation via the treatments to shift the
level of beliefs and thereby self-confidence worked.
32We focus on the expected rank in our analysis but everything holds analogously for expected earnings.
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Figure 9: Histogram for Self-Confidence
As seen in Figure 9, across both treatments, the mean and median respondents are
slightly overconfident (even in the hard treatment). The whole distribution is a little bit
skewed to the left but still resembles a normal distribution. Over 14% of the sample have
perfectly accurate beliefs and have a self-confidence of “0.” Small deviations from 0 could
be considered accurate as well because they could present a form of Bayesian updating.33
Still, a substantial fraction of participants seems to be tremendously overconfident.
Buying Decision
We find a significant positive correlation between expected rank (earnings) and the number
of goods participants want to buy. However, there is no significant relation between the
treatment itself and mean desired consumption as presented in Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Mean Consumption by
Treatment
If we run regressions where we can control for the variables that are unbalanced across
treatments, the picture stays the same: the treatment is positively related to the expected
33On this discussion, see Merkle and Weber (2011).
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rank, the expected rank is positively related to the desired amount of goods, but the
treatment is not related to the amount of goods (see Table 8).
Table 8: Consumption Decision
Exp. Rank No. Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.377** –0.133 –0.189
(0.175) (0.173) (0.171)
Exp. Rank 0.144*** 0.149***
(0.046) (0.046)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; A higher expected rank corresponds to a higher expected performance. Controls:
Health Status, Monthly HH income and Objective OI-Index.
A similar pattern emerges if we look explicitly at spending behavior (see Table 9). We
distinguish overborrowing, meaning buying more than actual earnings including endow-
ment can pay for, from overspending, meaning buying more than actual game earnings
can pay for, but the spending can still be paid with the endowment. The expected rank
as well as confidence have a significant e↵ect on both variables, but treatment does not.34
Table 9: Overborrowing and Overspending
Overconfidence Overborrowing Overspending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 1.217*** 0.010 –0.007 –0.034
(0.284) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045)
Overconfidence 0.014*** 0.044***
(0.004) (0.007)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 470 470 470 470
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Treatment: 0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; Controls: Health Status, Monthly HH income and Objective OI-Index.
A supplementary result we find worth mentioning is that being over-indebted in “real
life” is actually related to spending behavior in our experiment (see Table 10). Thus, those
34The level of significance is higher not lower when we exclude possibly “rational” participants who want
to buy more than they expect to earn in total.
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respondents who have problems controlling their spending in real life are also those who
spend less carefully in the game. Eventually, we see this as evidence that our experiment,
although highly artificial, still captures aspects of real life behavior.
Table 10: Overborrowing in the Game and in Real Life
No. Goods Overborrowing Overspending
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Obj. OI-Index –0.000 –0.001 0.050**
(0.077) (0.008) (0.021)
Subj. OI-Index 0.105 –0.005 0.043*
(0.078) (0.008) (0.022)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 471 471 471 471 471 471
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Controlled for confidence as defined in Equation 3.
Summarized, our treatments shifted expectations in hypothesized directions; expecta-
tions are positively related to spending behavior, but the treatment has no impact on the
latter. Therefore, we cannot claim that there is a causal link between expectations and
overborrowing in our experiment.
4.3 Confounding Factors
The previous findings are exceptionally robust to various restrictions. For example, they
are not driven by participants who are very old or have mild comprehension di culties (we
already excluded those with large di culties in the main analysis). It is also not the case
that the treatments only a↵ect expected ranks but not expected earnings.35 This suggests
that there are confounding factors or “noise” interfering with our treatments. We run
further analyses to rule out that the treatments a↵ected factors other than expectations:
Frustration and Gratification. One of the most likely confounds could be that partici-
pants in the hard treatment feel frustrated because of the di cult questions and want to
treat themselves with “shopping.” In contrast, some others might be proud of mastering
such a hard quiz and also want to reward themselves. Both motives should lead to the
result that, specifically, participants with extreme expectations behave di↵erently across
treatments. Participants who are frustrated should rank themselves rather low whereas
35This could happen if there is a piecewise treatment e↵ect (shifting expectations only within the same
earnings category) because earnings are only piecewise increasing in ranks and not equidistant.
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participants that are proud should rank themselves rather high. Subsequently, the buy-
ing behavior of participants with the same expected rank across treatments should be
significantly di↵erent for the lowest and highest ranks. However, the only (marginally)
significant di↵erence we can detect is for the five participants who expected to reach rank
two: here, participants in the hard treatment want to buy more than participants in the
easy treatment. Excluding these observations does not change our results. For all other
ranks, participants in both treatments exhibit the same spending pattern. This finding
does not favor frustration and gratification as being possible confounding factors.
Temptation. Another possibility is that participants in the hard treatment are more
susceptible to temptation goods. They have to exercise more cognitive e↵ort, which
decreases their self-control, so-called “ego depletion” (see, for example, Hagger et al.,
2010). Running separate regressions on each product, we find a significantly di↵erent
treatment e↵ect only for dried mango. Still, self-control (measured with the scale from
Tangney et al., 2004) and BMI do not have significant e↵ects on buying mango, which
opposes the ego depletion interpretation. We also do not find evidence that frustrated
(more depleted) participants are more likely to buy mango. Furthermore, detergent is the
most popular product and the share of detergent in all goods desired is not di↵erent across
treatments, whereas mango is the least popular. Detergent is the one product we would
expect to be least related to self-control issues. Summarized, we do not find convincing
evidence that persons in the hard treatment are more likely to give in to temptation.
Based on these tests, we argue that we can rule out the most probable factors interfering
with our treatment. We believe that the reason we do not find a treatment e↵ect on
spending and borrowing is that the shift in beliefs was not strong enough to eventually be
reflected in spending. We find additional evidence for this proposition when employing
IV estimation, where we instrument expected rank with treatment. Several tests indicate
that treatment is a weak instrument for expected rank.
We can only speculate why the well-established hard-easy gap is so small in our set-
ting. Consulting our interviewers, we have no reason to believe that participants did not
perceive the test quizzes as hard or easy when they should. Several other studies find
larger shifts in beliefs, although participants had less exposure to manipulation.36 The
rural Thai population may have more persistent beliefs than WEIRD populations. This
makes changing these beliefs more di cult. Given the tremendous level of overconfidence
we find, this circumstance might not be beneficial for our participants. It relates to our re-
36 For example, Grohmann et al. (2019) only use four questions they frame as “example questions” and
find larger treatment e↵ects on expectations.
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gression result that being too certain about future income is related to over-indebtedness.
“Sticky,” biased expectations, bear implications for policy making and must be taken into
account when measures to reduce over-indebtedness are designed.
5 Conclusion
Over-indebtedness can pose a serious threat to households’ welfare and the financial sta-
bility of a country, especially in emerging markets. However, the determinants underlying
over-indebtedness globally are, so far, not well understood. Theoretically, as modelled in
various permanent income hypotheses, higher income expectations should lead to a higher
level of borrowing.
In this study, we analyze the relationship between high income expectations and over-
indebtedness using data from an extensive household survey and a lab-in-the-field ex-
periment. Low levels of financial knowledge and high income uncertainty demand for
explicit research in emerging countries because relying on results for Western popula-
tions is insu cient. Our sample belongs to a panel survey of relatively poor and rural
households in Thailand. Indeed, we can confirm a low level of financial literacy in several
dimensions and find substantial uncertainty in income expectations for our sample. While
over-indebtedness is increasingly recognized as a growing problem in Thailand, our study
sheds light on one potential driver.
In our regression analysis, we find a strong and robust positive relationship between
high expectations concerning future income and over-indebtedness controlling for various
household characteristics and shocks. We think this is a sign that these expectations are
actually too high for some households. This finding holds for various measures of over-
indebtedness. They are stronger for objective measures, if we use a quantitative elicitation
method for positive income expectations based on probabilistic expectations and stronger
for subjective over-indebtedness, if we use a qualitative, more subjective forecast error. In
any case, they are always significant. The results reflect that subjective over-indebtedness
indicators are likely to be influenced more heavily by personal perceptions on the house-
hold’s financial situation as well as by respondents’ personality traits and that objective
and subjective measures capture di↵erent dimensions of over-indebtedness. Eventually,
higher certainty about the future household income development is also related to more
household over-indebtedness, which might be the case because being too certain is not
optimal given the highly uncertain environment. The results are robust to a diverse set
of di↵erent sample specifications and we do not find evidence of reverse causality issues.
We attempt to establish a causal relationship between overconfidence as a form of
biased expectation and overborrowing in our experiment by exogenously biasing self-
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confidence via the so-called hard-easy gap. Thereby, we change expectations about the
future payout in the game. Our results show that, in the experiment, overconfidence is
related to more spending and overborrowing, but we cannot claim causality. The most
probable reason why our treatments do not a↵ect spending behavior are too “sticky”
beliefs. This also suggests that rural households are indeed too certain about their income
expectations. Interestingly, we find that overspending in the experiment is related to
overspending in real life, which confirms that the artificial experiment still captures real
life behavior.
As we will never know the true income generating process, we cannot know whether the
expectations of our respondents are systematically biased or positive for other reasons. A
systematic overestimation of future income would have much more devastating e↵ects than
a random, one-shot, inaccurate guess. Nevertheless, we find reassuring evidence that even
one-time high expectations are positively related to household over-indebtedness, thus
pushing households into severe poverty. One of the potential channels through which high
expectations are related to over-indebtedness is being too certain about own expectations
in the highly uncertain environment that rural households in emerging markets are living
in. Given the supplemental evidence for sticky beliefs from our experiment, to change
beliefs or their certainty seems to be challenging. More appropriate policy measures
might reduce vulnerability and uncertainty with the expansion of assistance and insurance
schemes, especially for households engaged in agriculture.
34
References
Attanasio, Orazio and Britta Augsburg, 2016, “Subjective Expectations and Income Processes in
Rural India.” Economica, 83 (331), 416–442.
Attanasio, Orazio P., 2009, “Expectations and Perceptions in Developing Countries: Their Measure-
ment and Their Use.” American Economic Review, 99 (2), 87–92.
Attanasio, Orazio P. and Katja M. Kaufmann, 2014, “Education Choices and Returns to Schooling:
Mothers’ and Youths’ Subjective Expectations and Their Role by Gender.” Journal of Development
Economics, 109, 203–216.
Barrick, Murray R. and Michael K. Mount, 1991, “The Big Five Personality Dimensions and Job
Performance: A Meta-Analysis.” Personnel Psychology, 44 (1), 1–26.
Becker, Gary, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Edu-
cation, University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Benoit, Jean-Pierre, Juan Dubra, and Don A. Moore, 2015, “Does the Better-than-Average
E↵ect Show that People are Overconfident?: Two Experiments.” Journal of the European Economic
Association, 13 (2), 293–329.
Brunnermeier, Markus K. and Jonathan A. Parker, 2005, “Optimal Expectations.” American
Economic Review, 95 (4), 1092–1118.
Burke, Mary A. and Michael Manz, 2014, “Economic Literacy and Inflation Expectations: Evidence
from a Laboratory Experiment.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46 (7), 1421–1456.
Camerer, Colin and Dan Lovallo, 1999, “Overconfidence and Excess Entry: An Experimental Ap-
proach.” The American Economic Review, 89 (1), 306–318.
Cameron, A. Colin and Douglas L. Miller, 2015, “A Practitioner’s Guide to Cluster-robust Infer-
ence.” Journal of Human Resources, 50 (2), 317–372.
Chichaibelu, Bezawit Beyene and Hermann Waibel, 2017, “Borrowing from “Pui” to Pay “Pom”:
Multiple Borrowing and Over-Indebtedness in Rural Thailand.” World Development, 98, 338–350.
D’Alessio, Giovanni and Stefano Iezzi, “Household Over-indebtedness: Definition and Measurement
with Italian Data.” Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 149, Bank of Italy, Economic
Research and International Relations Area 2013.
Dargnies, Marie-Pierre, Rustamdjan Hakimov, and Dorothea Ku¨bler, 2019, “Self-Confidence
and Unraveling in Matching Markets.” Management Science. Forthcoming.
Delavande, Adeline, Xavier Gine´, and David McKenzie, 2011, “Measuring Subjective Expec-
tations in Developing Countries: A Critical Review and New Evidence.” Journal of Development
Economics, 94 (2), 151–163.
Demirguc-Kunt, Asli, Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, Saniya Ansar, and Jake Hess, Global
Findex Database 2017 : Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution, Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2018.
35
Dominitz, Je↵ and Charles F. Manski, 1997, “Using Expectations Data To Study Subjective Income
Expectations.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 92 (439), 855–867.
Friedman, Milton, A Theory of the Consumption Function, National Bureau of Economic Research,
Inc, 1957.
Gerlitz, Jean-Yves and Ju¨rgen Schupp, 2005, “Zur Erhebung der Big-Five-basierten Persoen-
lichkeitsmerkmale im SOEP.” DIW Research Notes, 4, 2005.
Grohmann, Antonia, Lukas Menkho↵, Christoph Merkle, and Renke Schmacker, “Earn More
Tomorrow: Overconfident Income Expectations and Consumer Indebtedness.” Discussion Paper 152,
CRC TRR 190 2019.
Guiso, Luigi, Tullio Jappelli, and Luigi Pistaferri, 2002, “An Empirical Analysis of Earnings and
Employment Risk.” Journal of Business and Economic Statistics, 20 (2), 241–53.
Hagger, Martin S., Chantelle Wood, Chris Sti↵, and Nikos L.D. Chatzisarantis, 2010, “Ego
Depletion and the Strength Model of Self-Control: A Meta-Analysis.” Psychological Bulletin, 136 (4),
495–525.
Hardeweg, Bernd, Lukas Menkho↵, and Hermann Waibel, 2013, “Experimentally Validated
Survey Evidence on Individual Risk Attitudes in Rural Thailand.” Economic Development and Cultural
Change, 61 (4), 859–888.
Hartwig, Marissa K. and John Dunlosky, 2014, “The Contribution of Judgment Scale to the
Unskilled-and-Unaware Phenomenon: How Evaluating Others Can Exaggerate Over-(and Under-)
Confidence.” Memory and Cognition, 42 (1), 164–173.
Heger, Stephanie A. and Nicholas W. Papageorge, 2018, “We Should Totally Open a Restaurant:
How Optimism and Overconfidence A↵ect Beliefs.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 67, 177–190.
Hyytinen, Ari and Hanna Putkuri, 2018, “Household Optimism and Overborrowing.” Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking, 50 (1), 55–76.
IMF, Global Financial Stability Report: Is Growth at Risk?, Washington, DC: International Monetary
Fund, 2017.
John, Oliver P. and Sanjay Srivastava, 1999, “The Big Five Trait Taxonomy: History, Measurement,
and Theoretical Perspectives.” Handbook of Personality: Theory and Research, 2 (1999), 102–138.
Johnson, Dominic D. P. and James H. Fowler, 2011, “The Evolution of Overconfidence.” Nature,
477, 317–320.
Keese, Matthias, 2012, “Who Feels Constrained by High Debt Burdens? Subjective vs. Objective
Measures of Household Debt.” Journal of Economic Psychology, 33 (1), 125–141.
Klasen, Stephan and Hermann Waibel, 2015, “Vulnerability to Poverty in South-East Asia: Drivers,
Measurement, Responses, and Policy Issues.” World Development, 71, 1–3.
Kling, Je↵rey R., Je↵rey B. Liebman, and Lawrence F. Katz, 2007, “Experimental Analysis of
Neighborhood E↵ects.” Econometrica, 75 (1), 83–119.
36
Lao, Rattana, Thomas I. Parks, Charn Sangvirojkul, Aram Lek-Uthai, Atipong
Pathanasethpong, Pii Arporniem, Thannaporn Takkhin, and Kroekkiat Tiamsai, Thai-
land’s Inequality: Myths & Reality of Isan, The Asia Foundation, 2019.
Loayza, Norman V., Romain Rancie`re, Luis Serve´n, and Jaume Ventura, 2007, “Macroeco-
nomic Volatility and Welfare in Developing Countries: An Introduction.” The World Bank Economic
Review, 21 (3), 343–357.
Lusardi, Annamaria and Peter Tufano, 2015, “Debt Literacy, Financial Experiences, and
Overindebtedness.” Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, 14 (04), 332–368.
Manski, Charles F., 2004, “Measuring Expectations.” Econometrica, 72 (5), 1329–1376.
McClelland, David C., John W. Atkinson, Russell A. Clark, and Edgar L. Lowell, The
Achievement Motive., East Norwalk, CT, US: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1953.
McKenzie, David, John Gibson, and Steven Stillman, 2013, “A Land of Milk and Honey with
Streets Paved with Gold: Do Emigrants Have Over-Optimistic Expectations About Incomes Abroad?”
Journal of Development Economics, 102, 116–127.
Menkho↵, Lukas and Ornsiri Rungruxsirivorn, 2011, “Do Village Funds Improve Access to Fi-
nance? Evidence from Thailand.” World Development, 39 (1), 110–122.
Merkle, Christoph and Martin Weber, 2011, “True Overconfidence: The Inability of Rational
Information Processing to Account for Apparent Overconfidence.”Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 116 (2), 262–271.
Moore, Don A. and Paul J. Healy, 2008, “The Trouble with Overconfidence.” Psychological Review,
115 (2), 502–517.
OECD, OECD/INFE International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy Competencies, Paris: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016.
OECD, OECD/INFE Toolkit for Measuring Financial Literacy and Financial Inclusion, Paris: Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2018.
Schicks, Jessica, 2013, “The Sacrifices of Micro-Borrowers in Ghana - A Customer-Protection Perspec-
tive on Measuring Over-Indebtedness.” The Journal of Development Studies, 49 (9), 1238–1255.
Souleles, Nicholas, 2004, “Expectations, Heterogeneous Forecast Errors, and Consumption: Micro
Evidence from the Michigan Consumer Sentiment Surveys.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
36 (1), 39–72.
Tambunlertchai, Kanittha, “Financial Inclusion, Financial Regulation, and Financial Education in
Thailand.” ADBI Working Paper 537, Asian Development Bank Institute, Tokyo 2015.
Tangney, June P., Roy F. Baumeister, and Angie Luzio Boone, 2004, “High Self-Control Predicts
Good Adjustment, Less Pathology, Better Grades, and Interpersonal Success.” Journal of Personality,
72 (2), 271–324.
37
Terada, Yuka and Paul Vandenberg, “Thailand’s State-Led Approach to Financial Inclusion.” in
Asian Development Bank Institute, ed., Financial Inclusion in Asia: Country Surveys, Tokyo: Asian
Development Bank Institute, 2014, chapter 5, pp. 89–110.
World Bank, “The World Bank in Thailand.” https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/thailand/
overview 2019. [Online; accessed 21-October-2019].
Zinman, Jonathan, 2015, “Household Debt: Facts, Puzzles, Theories, and Policies.” Annual Review of
Economics, 7 (1), 251–276.
38
Appendix
A Survey Appendix
Figure A.1: Household Debt to GDP Ratio, Selected Emerging Markets
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Table A.2: Subsample Probability Question: Objective OI-Indicators
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Negative –0.088 –0.067 –0.024 –0.003 –0.008
(0.166) (0.052) (0.093) (0.043) (0.061)
Negative 0.061 –0.071 0.075 0.079** –0.009
(0.178) (0.064) (0.075) (0.038) (0.066)
Neutral 0.109 0.010 0.033 0.090 –0.014
(0.196) (0.076) (0.066) (0.060) (0.068)
Positive 0.373** 0.105** 0.218*** 0.141*** –0.025
(0.137) (0.047) (0.063) (0.043) (0.058)
Constant –1.978** –0.103 –0.914*** –0.008 –0.448
(0.845) (0.315) (0.316) (0.303) (0.383)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 525 525 525 522 525
Adj. R-squared 0.092 0.054 0.124 0.044 0.039
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Table A.3: Subsample Probability Question: Subjective OI-Indicators
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Negative 0.210 –0.003 0.059 0.282**
(0.131) (0.115) (0.047) (0.106)
Negative 0.124 0.044 0.012 0.207
(0.118) (0.135) (0.027) (0.154)
Neutral 0.019 0.026 0.017 –0.073
(0.115) (0.127) (0.024) (0.094)
Positive 0.343*** 0.213** 0.057** 0.351***
(0.092) (0.083) (0.025) (0.120)
Constant –0.872 –1.816** 0.059 0.154
(0.829) (0.726) (0.181) (0.688)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 525 525 523 525
Adj. R-squared 0.109 0.076 0.055 0.119
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table A.4: Subsample Financial Decision Makers: Objective OI-Indicators
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Negative –0.098 –0.024 –0.032 –0.027 –0.031
(0.154) (0.055) (0.085) (0.040) (0.067)
Negative –0.016 –0.064 0.076 0.045 –0.069
(0.141) (0.051) (0.064) (0.035) (0.072)
Neutral 0.094 0.002 0.041 0.083 –0.023
(0.197) (0.070) (0.067) (0.060) (0.078)
Positive 0.352** 0.093 0.212*** 0.132*** –0.023
(0.153) (0.055) (0.073) (0.042) (0.064)
Constant –1.394* 0.082 –0.634** 0.076 –0.299
(0.676) (0.340) (0.292) (0.236) (0.308)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 572 575
Adj. R-squared 0.094 0.040 0.141 0.046 0.046
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Table A.5: Subsample Financial Decision Makers: Subjective OI-Indicators
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very Negative 0.141 –0.041 0.047 0.204*
(0.122) (0.134) (0.040) (0.116)
Negative 0.108 –0.042 0.021 0.245
(0.120) (0.116) (0.027) (0.208)
Neutral –0.030 –0.053 0.013 –0.074
(0.115) (0.114) (0.018) (0.135)
Positive 0.252** 0.148** 0.040 0.278*
(0.100) (0.069) (0.026) (0.156)
Constant –0.181 –1.442** 0.194 0.848
(0.710) (0.563) (0.179) (0.787)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 573 575
Adj. R-squared 0.140 0.108 0.065 0.132
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table A.6: Interaction of Over-Indebtedness Indices with Conscientiousness
Obj. Index Subj. Debt Index
(1) (2)
Very Negative –0.409 1.102
(0.747) (0.867)
Negative –0.767 0.834
(0.498) (0.668)
Neutral –0.184 0.169
(0.801) (0.596)
Positive –0.071 0.909
(0.773) (0.592)
Conscientiousness –0.105 0.077
(0.069) (0.085)
Very neg. x Conscient. 0.068 –0.155
(0.127) (0.140)
Negative x Conscient. 0.144* –0.119
(0.076) (0.107)
Neutral x Conscient. 0.056 –0.021
(0.127) (0.103)
Positive x Conscient. 0.071 –0.113
(0.122) (0.106)
Constant –0.859 –0.942
(0.777) (0.769)
Controls Yes Yes
Observations 676 676
Adj. R-squared 0.095 0.130
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table A.7: Objective Over-Indebtedness, Quantitative Inc. Forecast Dummy
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Quant. Inc. Forecast Dummy 0.269** 0.245** 0.131*** 0.095** 0.163*** 0.137** 0.058* 0.077** –0.033 –0.022
(0.097) (0.101) (0.036) (0.038) (0.049) (0.049) (0.031) (0.034) (0.035) (0.040)
Farming Shocks –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Environ. Shocks 0.005*** –0.000 0.002*** 0.002* 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Shocks 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks –0.014 –0.003 –0.012*** –0.001 –0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Shocks –0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000* –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –0.061 –1.274** 0.150*** 0.133 0.358***–0.518* 0.141*** 0.074 0.237***–0.314
(0.091) (0.546) (0.031) (0.285) (0.042) (0.294) (0.015) (0.226) (0.044) (0.265)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 676 686 676 686 676 683 673 686 676
Adj. R-squared 0.012 0.099 0.020 0.048 0.019 0.121 0.003 0.037 -0.000 0.055
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.Households with a mildly negative
income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score,
loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed,
main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference,
self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table A.8: Subjective Over-Indebtedness, Quantitative Inc. Forecast Dummy
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Quant. Inc. Forecast Dummy 0.063 0.172* 0.105 0.165* –0.005 0.019 0.054 0.146
(0.097) (0.093) (0.094) (0.086) (0.020) (0.024) (0.079) (0.087)
Farming Shocks –0.001 0.001 –0.000** –0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Environmental Shocks 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.004*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.000 0.003** –0.001 –0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Crime Shocks 0.000 –0.006 0.003 –0.006
(0.014) (0.008) (0.003) (0.015)
Other Shocks 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –0.037 –0.430 –0.044 –1.447*** 0.066*** 0.152 –0.100* 0.377
(0.040) (0.566) (0.045) (0.504) (0.011) (0.147) (0.050) (0.584)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 686 676 686 676 684 674 686 676
Adj. R-squared -0.001 0.133 0.001 0.099 -0.001 0.073 -0.001 0.117
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Households with
a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10),
children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from
other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household
income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table A.9: Certainty Measure - Objective Over-Indebtedness - Quantitative Inc.
Forecast Dummy
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Quant. Inc. Forecast Dummy 0.242** 0.096** 0.130** 0.079** –0.023
(0.103) (0.040) (0.050) (0.035) (0.041)
Certainty 0.127* 0.053** 0.043 –0.008 0.062**
(0.061) (0.023) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022)
Constant –1.406** 0.080 –0.587* 0.160 –0.443
(0.526) (0.286) (0.299) (0.247) (0.262)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 664 661 664
Adj. R-squared 0.102 0.056 0.121 0.035 0.063
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses.Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Table A.10: Certainty Measure - Subjective Over-Indebtedness - Quantitative Inc.
Forecast Dummy
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Quant. Inc. Forecast Dummy 0.156 0.160* 0.014 0.133
(0.094) (0.091) (0.022) (0.091)
Certainty 0.064 0.090 0.005 0.023
(0.089) (0.066) (0.021) (0.107)
Constant –0.609 –1.761*** 0.154 0.331
(0.630) (0.571) (0.153) (0.726)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 664 664 662 664
Adj. R-squared 0.133 0.103 0.072 0.112
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with a mildly negative income forecast serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared,
children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks,
loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-
employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh,
risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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B The Qualitative Forecast Error
Deriving the Qualitative Forecast Error
We develop a measure of expectation accuracy closely following Souleles (2004) and Hyytinen and Putkuri
(2018), which enables us to replicate the latter authors’ results. We make use of the available panel data
and combine categorical answers to the question, “How do you think your average monthly income will
develop in the next twelve months?” (Et 1(Inci,t)) asked in 2016 (one year prior to our survey) with
responses to the question “Do you think your household is better o↵ than last year” asked in 2017
(A(Inci,t)).1 We call the di↵erence between these two questions qualitative forecast error:
Qualitative Forecast Error = A(Inci,t)  Et 1(Inci,t) (1)
A positive qualitative forecast error occurs if the expected household situation is better than the realized
one and a negative if the opposite is true. We form five categories ranging from a very negative to a very
positive qualitative forecast error, which enter the regression analysis as dummy variables. The category
with households making no forecast error serves as omitted group.
As the qualitative forecast error is derived at the household level, the respondent may not be the
same for all three data points. Therefore, we re-run the analysis for a sub-sample with only identical
respondents, which does not change the results. We assume that the household’s qualitative assessment
regarding its own development stays similar for a time period of two years and, thus, is able to explain
indebtedness in 2017. There are two reasons encouraging this view: We are able to control for a rich
set of socio-economic variables that capture household formation and, as incomes are rather stationary,
expectations may also change slowly.
Results for the Qualitative Forecast Error
The regressions we run for the qualitative forecast error take the same form as the ones for the quantitative
income forecast (standard errors are clustered at the district level):
Over   Indebtedness Indexi =  0 +  1Qual.FEi +X 0i 2 + ✏i (2)
Results for the objective and subjective over-indebtedness indices are presented in Tables B.1 and B.2.
With regards to the relationship between the objective OI-Index and the qualitative forecast error, we
find that over-indebtedness increases by 0.42 points if respondents exhibit a very positive forecast error.
The results are driven by two components: the remaining debt to service ratio (columns (5) and (6), Table
B.1) and the probability of whether people paid late or defaulted on a loan (columns (7) and (8)). The
results are similar to those of the quantitative income forecast. We again find that very positive forecasts
are related to a higher probability of being objectively over-indebted. Point estimates are slightly higher
for results from the qualitative forecast error. Regarding the impact of losses from shocks as well as
additional control variables, results are similar to those of the quantitative income forecast. Overall,
results from the qualitative forecast error confirm the findings from the quantitative income forecast:
positive future income expectations are related to increasing objective over-indebtedness.
1 Answer options range on a scale from 1-5. For the question asked in 2016, one means “increase a lot”
and five “decrease a lot.” The question asked in 2017 ranges from one being “much better o↵” to five
“much worse o↵.”
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Table B.1: Qualitative Forecast Error - Main Results Objective OI-Indicators
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very negative 0.130 0.179 –0.089 –0.073 0.118 0.148 0.106 0.109 0.024 0.034
(0.222) (0.236) (0.061) (0.067) (0.129) (0.142) (0.106) (0.101) (0.067) (0.065)
Negative –0.158** –0.055 –0.046 –0.030 –0.033 0.006 –0.026 –0.003 –0.076 –0.033
(0.063) (0.069) (0.032) (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.028) (0.029) (0.047) (0.048)
Positive 0.165** 0.069 0.007 –0.009 0.087* 0.044 0.035 0.014 0.069 0.034
(0.064) (0.070) (0.031) (0.034) (0.045) (0.040) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041) (0.039)
Very Positive 0.443** 0.410** 0.070 0.052 0.194*** 0.182*** 0.151* 0.149** 0.100 0.093
(0.170) (0.144) (0.073) (0.068) (0.058) (0.050) (0.073) (0.067) (0.063) (0.057)
Farming Shocks 0.000 0.000 –0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Environmental Shocks 0.003** –0.000 0.002*** 0.001 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Shocks 0.003*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Crime Shocks –0.012*** –0.003*** –0.006** –0.002 –0.003
(0.004) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Other Shocks –0.000 –0.000** –0.000 0.000 –0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –0.059 –1.264** 0.184*** 0.190 0.359***–0.508* 0.132*** 0.059 0.214***–0.355
(0.082) (0.584) (0.032) (0.320) (0.032) (0.290) (0.020) (0.229) (0.038) (0.275)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.022 0.120 0.002 0.044 0.014 0.124 0.013 0.050 0.011 0.063
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Additional controls: age,
age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, main income farming, main income employed, main income
self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference,
self-control, social status, total hh education.
We also find a strongly significant relationship between positive qualitative forecast errors and sub-
jective over-indebtedness. This relationship is much stronger than for the quantitative income forecast.
Again, we only find a robust relationship for households in the group with the largest positive forecasts.
The subjective OI-Index increases by 0.42 points for respondents who exhibit very positive forecast errors
(columns (1) and (2), Table B.2). Mainly, this is due to the positive relationship between the forecast er-
ror and the “debt position” component of the index and the sacrifice index component. Households with
a very positive error tend to state more frequently that they “have too much debt right now” (columns
(3) and (4)) and that they make an increasing number of everyday sacrifices to repay their loans (column
(7) and (8)). We conclude that the nature of the qualitative forecast error being more “subjectively”
elicited than the calculated quantitative income forecast per se, might be reflected in more pronounced
results regarding subjectively “felt” debt. This is also in line with our analysis from the quantitative
income forecast that subjective over-indebtedness may rather be a concept of perceived financial distress
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a↵ected by not only the household’s true debt situation but also by respondent characteristics.
Table B.2: Qualitative Forecast Error - Main Results Subjective OI-Indicators
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very negative 0.218 0.140 0.064 0.055 0.052 0.027 0.243 0.167
(0.258) (0.245) (0.230) (0.261) (0.068) (0.060) (0.214) (0.198)
Negative –0.025 0.030 –0.091 –0.011 0.030 0.028 –0.096 –0.046
(0.127) (0.103) (0.072) (0.061) (0.035) (0.031) (0.153) (0.134)
Positive 0.208** 0.105 0.139* 0.065 0.021 0.011 0.265* 0.134
(0.077) (0.083) (0.072) (0.069) (0.016) (0.019) (0.150) (0.133)
Very Positive 0.476** 0.455** 0.351* 0.361** 0.091 0.086 0.352* 0.308*
(0.208) (0.186) (0.177) (0.155) (0.053) (0.053) (0.187) (0.160)
Farming Shocks 0.000 0.000 0.000 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Environ. Shocks 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.000 0.002** –0.000* 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Crime Shocks –0.003 –0.000 –0.000 –0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002) (0.006)
Other Shocks 0.001*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant –0.122** –0.499 –0.074 –1.459** 0.043*** 0.122 –0.176** 0.357
(0.057) (0.664) (0.050) (0.530) (0.014) (0.175) (0.072) (0.626)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.019 0.136 0.015 0.102 0.006 0.073 0.012 0.115
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, main income
farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017,
no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Furthermore, we again add an income certainty measure to the regression. Results are presented in
Tables B.3 and B.4. There is no relationship between future income certainty on objective and subjective
over-indebtedness. For the subjective OI-Indicators, results are in line with those from the quantitative
income forecast. However, they di↵er for objective over-indebtedness. While we find that higher income
certainty is related to higher objective over-indebtedness with respect to the quantitative income forecast,
we do not find that relationship with the qualitative error. This may be due to the more subjective nature
of the qualitative forecast error.
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Table B.3: Objective Over-Indebtedness - Income Certainty
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very negative 0.180 –0.075 0.151 0.110 0.034
(0.242) (0.067) (0.145) (0.102) (0.066)
Negative –0.056 –0.030 0.007 –0.004 –0.034
(0.068) (0.035) (0.044) (0.029) (0.048)
Positive 0.070 –0.010 0.045 0.015 0.034
(0.069) (0.034) (0.040) (0.035) (0.039)
Very Positive 0.465** 0.093 0.187*** 0.153* 0.104*
(0.164) (0.078) (0.059) (0.074) (0.058)
Certainty 0.046 0.030 0.008 0.004 0.011
(0.049) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.024)
Constant –1.481** –0.001 –0.640** 0.066 –0.297
(0.551) (0.295) (0.280) (0.262) (0.261)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 663 663 663 660 663
Adj. R-squared 0.118 0.050 0.122 0.046 0.058
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with no forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6),
children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from
environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed,
main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk
preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table B.4: Subjective Over-Indebtedness - Income Certainty
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Very negative 0.150 0.063 0.026 0.186
(0.242) (0.258) (0.060) (0.192)
Negative 0.028 –0.012 0.028 –0.048
(0.104) (0.061) (0.031) (0.136)
Positive 0.109 0.068 0.011 0.141
(0.085) (0.071) (0.019) (0.135)
Very Positive 0.578** 0.429** 0.116* 0.400**
(0.211) (0.191) (0.064) (0.169)
Certainty –0.035 –0.033 0.010 –0.103
(0.058) (0.048) (0.012) (0.072)
Constant –0.356 –1.374** 0.128 0.605
(0.667) (0.563) (0.181) (0.629)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 663 663 661 663
Adj. R-squared 0.143 0.104 0.076 0.121
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with no forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6),
children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from
environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed,
main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk
preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
Overall, results from the qualitative forecast error confirm the main findings from the quantitative
income forecast: very positive forecasts are related to a higher level of over-indebtedness. There is no such
relationship for negative forecasts and over-indebtedness. The results also support the analysis from the
quantitative income forecast that subjective and objective over-indebtedness indicators measure di↵erent
dimensions of indebtedness. Finally, our results from the qualitative forecast error are in line with those
of Hyytinen and Putkuri (2018). They report that households with a very positive forecast error are
more likely to be over-indebted and that such a pattern cannot be found for households with negative
forecast errors. Our results show the same relationship.
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C Experiment Appendix
Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics by Participation in Game
Full Sample Participating Non-Participating Di↵erence
Sex 1.66 1.63 1.76 0.12⇤⇤⇤
Age 57.01 56.35 59.78 3.43⇤⇤⇤
Relation to HH Head 1.67 1.66 1.71 0.05
Marital Status 2.15 2.14 2.22 0.09
Main Occupation 4.97 4.66 6.29 1.64⇤
Years of Schooling 5.74 5.83 5.33  0.51⇤
Children (0-6 years) 0.32 0.32 0.33 0.01
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.02
Numeracy 2.05 2.13 1.69  0.45⇤⇤⇤
Health Status 1.40 1.38 1.46 0.08
BMI 23.64 23.70 23.41  0.28
Fin. Decision Maker 1.57 1.56 1.60 0.03
Self Control 21.26 21.02 22.26 1.24
Risk Taking 3.95 3.99 3.78  0.21
Fin. Risk Taking 3.94 4.04 3.57  0.47⇤⇤
FL-Score 5.50 5.63 4.95  0.68⇤⇤⇤
Monthly Inc. 2017 19197.02 19313.71 18704.57  609.14
Obj. OI-Index 0.00 0.00  0.00  0.00
Subj. OI-Index  0.00  0.01 0.03 0.04
Morning 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.00
Midday 0.24 0.26 0.17  0.09⇤⇤⇤
Observations 748 604 144 748
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Table C.2: Linear Probability Model Participation in Game
Participation
Sex –0.077**
(0.036)
Age –0.003**
(0.002)
Fin. Risk Taking 0.023**
(0.010)
FL-Score 0.020**
(0.010)
Morning 0.083**
(0.040)
Midday 0.144***
(0.043)
Observations 717
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Only significant variables reported, remaining
variables are the same as in Table C.1.
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Table C.3: Descriptive Statistics for Excluded Sample
Full Sample In Out Di↵erence
Sex 1.65 1.64 1.67  0.03
Age 56.40 56.16 57.75  1.59
Relation to HH Head 1.68 1.70 1.56 0.14
Marital Status 2.14 2.13 2.24  0.11
Main Occupation 4.68 4.79 4.08 0.71
Years of Schooling 5.87 5.92 5.60 0.32
Children (0-6 years) 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.08
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.26 0.13 0.13⇤⇤⇤
Numeracy 2.13 2.14 2.04 0.11
Health Status 1.38 1.38 1.38 0.00
BMI 23.69 23.58 24.27  0.68
Fin. Decision Maker 1.56 1.57 1.52 0.05
Self Control 21.05 20.94 21.62  0.67
Risk Taking 3.98 4.02 3.74 0.28
Fin. Risk Taking 4.03 4.06 3.90 0.15
FL-Score 5.62 5.66 5.40 0.26
Monthly Inc. 2017 18523.65 18653.06 17798.04 855.02
Obj. OI-Index 0.01 0.01  0.02 0.03
Subj. OI-Index  0.03  0.04 0.05  0.09
Read Alone 1.45 1.44 1.49  0.04
Di culties 1.15 1.14 1.21  0.08
Observations 555 471 84 555
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
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Figure C.1: CDF for the Expected Rank by Treatment, After the Main Quiz
53
The Rationals
As mentioned above, so far we have excluded experiment participants who want to buy more than they
expect to earn. We refer to these persons as “rationals.” In this section, we discuss whether these
participants are actually rational or had di culties in understanding the experiment and how including
these observations change our results. Comparing our main sample against all rationals does not yield
results that di↵er substantially from those presented in Table C.3. However, if we divide the rationals
into those participants who want to buy more than expected earnings could pay for but less than eight
goods and those who want to buy exactly eight goods (which would be the “truely” rational decision), we
find interesting di↵erences. The former group has significantly lower education, numeracy, and financial
literacy than the main sample (see Table C.4). We see this as evidence that they may have had di culties
understanding the game (from here on, we refer to these individuals as non-rationals). It does not seem to
be the case, however, that these are persons who generally have problems controlling their own spending
behavior (also outside the lab) because their debt to service ratio is significantly smaller compared to the
main sample.
Table C.4: Descriptive Statistics for Non-Rationals (only significant e↵ects reported)
Full Sample Others Non-Rationals Di↵erence
Years of Schooling 5.84 5.91 5.00 0.91⇤⇤⇤
Children (7-10 years) 0.24 0.26 0.12 0.14⇤⇤
Numeracy 2.10 2.13 1.76 0.36⇤
FL-Score 5.60 5.64 5.10 0.54⇤
Observations 532 490 42 532
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
The remaining rationals, however, not only have significantly higher numeracy and financial literacy,
but also have a better understanding of the game as perceived by the interviewers (see Table C.5) (for
non-rationals the di↵erence is in the opposite direction, but not significant). Thus, these participants
might have taken advantage of the set-up and reasoned that it is optimal for them to buy as many goods
as possible because of the large discount.
Table C.5: Descriptive Statistics for Rationals (only significant e↵ects reported)
Full Sample Others Rationals Di↵erence
Main Occupation 4.70 4.76 3.48 1.28⇤
Numeracy 2.16 2.13 2.78  0.66⇤
FL-Score 5.66 5.64 6.22  0.58⇤
Di culties in Game 1.15 1.16 1.00 0.16⇤⇤⇤
Observations 513 490 23 513
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.
Including these two groups into the analysis, the results change as anticipated: the e↵ect of expected
rank on goods turns insignificant and negligible (see Table C.6). All other e↵ects are almost unchanged.
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Table C.6: Consumption Decision including Rationals
Exp. Rank No. Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.373** –0.234 –0.254
(0.168) (0.199) (0.199)
Exp. Rank 0.048 0.054
(0.052) (0.052)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 511 511 511 511
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Standard errors in parentheses. Treatment:
0=Hard Quiz, 1=Easy Quiz; A higher expected rank corresponds to a higher expected performance. Controls: Health
Status, Monthly HH income and Objective OI-Index.
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I Additional Regression Tables
Table 1: Full Regression Output for Main Regression - Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very Negative −0.125 −0.017 −0.097* −0.022 −0.073 0.011 0.017 −0.015 0.001 0.010
(0.151) (0.143) (0.047) (0.050) (0.081) (0.079) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.060)
Negative 0.050 0.058 −0.067 −0.054 0.075 0.100* 0.081** 0.066** −0.029 −0.037
(0.134) (0.132) (0.045) (0.048) (0.058) (0.057) (0.032) (0.029) (0.057) (0.058)
Neutral 0.153 0.135 0.025 0.002 0.079 0.067 0.074 0.095* −0.002 −0.010
(0.153) (0.168) (0.050) (0.060) (0.058) (0.064) (0.045) (0.051) (0.061) (0.063)
Positive 0.289** 0.333** 0.098** 0.087* 0.187** 0.210*** 0.109*** 0.133***−0.054 −0.037
(0.134) (0.136) (0.042) (0.047) (0.072) (0.069) (0.038) (0.041) (0.055) (0.060)
Monthly Inc. 2017 −0.000 −0.000* −0.000*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.061*** 0.007 0.031*** 0.015* 0.019***
(0.017) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Age Squared −0.001*** −0.000 −0.000*** −0.000** −0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FL-Score 0.021 0.008 0.018*** −0.010 0.012
(0.018) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Risk Preference 0.054*** 0.013* 0.026*** 0.012 0.013
(0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Self-Control 0.001 −0.002 −0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.006) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Main Inc. Farming −0.122 −0.066 −0.006 −0.090 0.032
(0.155) (0.059) (0.091) (0.057) (0.044)
Main Inc. Employed −0.194 −0.106* −0.032 −0.022 −0.063
(0.166) (0.059) (0.076) (0.057) (0.055)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. −0.163 −0.087 −0.025 −0.025 −0.053
(0.212) (0.089) (0.099) (0.068) (0.061)
Main Inc. Remitt. −0.151 −0.068 −0.016 −0.070 −0.015
(0.144) (0.060) (0.057) (0.058) (0.037)
Children (0-6 yrs) −0.085* −0.012 −0.057** 0.007 −0.045**
(0.047) (0.017) (0.026) (0.027) (0.020)
Children (7-10 yrs) 0.092 0.012 0.079** 0.008 0.019
(0.082) (0.048) (0.033) (0.022) (0.036)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.030 −0.017 0.017 0.025 0.009
(0.040) (0.020) (0.021) (0.020) (0.019)
No. of Elders 0.036 0.003 0.036* 0.034* −0.032
(0.040) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.023)
No. of Working Mem. 0.072* 0.022 0.008 0.002 0.051**
(0.042) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.021)
Total HH Education −0.001 −0.000 0.002 −0.000 −0.003
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Farming Shocks −0.000 −0.000 0.000 −0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Environ. Shocks 0.005*** −0.000 0.002*** 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Economic Shocks 0.003*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.001* 0.000
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.016* −0.004* −0.013*** −0.002 −0.001
(0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Other Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000** −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Social Status −0.140* −0.021 −0.028 −0.056*** −0.051
(0.071) (0.023) (0.033) (0.019) (0.032)
Constant −0.073 −1.425** 0.189*** 0.119 0.343***−0.617** 0.099***−0.016 0.245***−0.291
(0.144) (0.576) (0.048) (0.296) (0.072) (0.286) (0.019) (0.243) (0.063) (0.280)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.014 0.099 0.025 0.046 0.025 0.125 0.007 0.044 -0.003 0.053
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 2: Full Regression Output for Main Regression - Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very Negative 0.182 0.215* 0.040 0.036 0.065** 0.058 0.118 0.245**
(0.112) (0.122) (0.114) (0.110) (0.029) (0.039) (0.106) (0.103)
Negative 0.157 0.150 0.096 0.046 0.037 0.033 0.108 0.178
(0.135) (0.110) (0.111) (0.109) (0.025) (0.026) (0.174) (0.154)
Neutral −0.007 0.048 −0.021 0.008 0.022 0.031 −0.098 −0.035
(0.104) (0.092) (0.096) (0.094) (0.021) (0.019) (0.128) (0.095)
Positive 0.144 0.258** 0.113 0.181** 0.024 0.041* 0.113 0.245*
(0.086) (0.101) (0.071) (0.084) (0.021) (0.023) (0.120) (0.122)
Monthly Inc. 2017 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.007* 0.042**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.004) (0.018)
Age Squared −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.000** −0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FL-Score −0.026** 0.007 −0.007** −0.047**
(0.012) (0.010) (0.003) (0.018)
Risk Preference 0.044** 0.057*** 0.003 0.023
(0.017) (0.018) (0.005) (0.019)
Self-Control 0.009** 0.005 0.001 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005)
Main Inc. Farming −0.192** −0.159 0.007 −0.323**
(0.078) (0.100) (0.032) (0.140)
Main Inc. Employed 0.042 0.017 0.047 −0.138
(0.121) (0.114) (0.037) (0.176)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. −0.019 −0.019 0.031 −0.178
(0.139) (0.108) (0.046) (0.164)
Main Inc. Remitt. −0.159 −0.251** 0.020 −0.176
(0.102) (0.090) (0.036) (0.165)
Children (0-6 yrs) −0.091 −0.101** −0.012 −0.046
(0.062) (0.048) (0.016) (0.063)
Children (7-10 yrs) −0.084 0.039 −0.026 −0.162
(0.075) (0.071) (0.019) (0.094)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.007 −0.002 −0.022 0.123*
(0.063) (0.037) (0.022) (0.066)
No. of Elders 0.026 0.043 0.012 −0.045
(0.036) (0.042) (0.011) (0.056)
No. of Working Mem. 0.121*** 0.123*** −0.005 0.182***
(0.042) (0.033) (0.014) (0.045)
Total HH Education −0.009** −0.008** 0.001 −0.019***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.001) (0.005)
Farming Shocks −0.001 0.002 −0.000* −0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Environmental Shocks 0.007*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.003
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Economic Shocks 0.001 0.003** −0.000 −0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002)
Crime Shocks 0.000 −0.006 0.003 −0.005
(0.014) (0.007) (0.003) (0.014)
Other Shocks 0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Social Status −0.353*** −0.184*** −0.069*** −0.371***
(0.079) (0.045) (0.023) (0.092)
Constant −0.115 −0.482 −0.064 −1.480*** 0.035** 0.140 −0.131 0.344
(0.082) (0.593) (0.081) (0.514) (0.016) (0.155) (0.111) (0.591)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.133 -0.002 0.094 0.002 0.073 -0.001 0.119
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 3: Additional Regression on Big5 Measures - Objective Over-Indebtedness
Obj. Index DSR > 0.4 RDSR > 0.4 Paid Late/Default > 2 Loans
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Very Negative −0.125 −0.032 −0.097* −0.026 −0.073 0.006 0.017 −0.021 0.001 0.008
(0.151) (0.137) (0.047) (0.050) (0.081) (0.076) (0.033) (0.036) (0.059) (0.059)
Negative 0.050 0.056 −0.067 −0.052 0.075 0.097* 0.081** 0.062** −0.029 −0.035
(0.134) (0.133) (0.045) (0.050) (0.058) (0.056) (0.032) (0.029) (0.057) (0.061)
Neutral 0.153 0.111 0.025 −0.001 0.079 0.059 0.074 0.087* −0.002 −0.019
(0.153) (0.160) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.045) (0.050) (0.061) (0.063)
Positive 0.289** 0.311** 0.098** 0.084* 0.187** 0.206*** 0.109*** 0.128***−0.054 −0.050
(0.134) (0.135) (0.042) (0.046) (0.072) (0.072) (0.038) (0.040) (0.055) (0.060)
Openness 0.100*** 0.028*** 0.040** 0.027** 0.022
(0.030) (0.008) (0.016) (0.012) (0.016)
Conscientiousn. −0.083** −0.016 −0.036** −0.025 −0.020
(0.031) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.013)
Extraversion −0.003 0.013 −0.013 −0.018 0.014
(0.038) (0.013) (0.021) (0.015) (0.015)
Agreeableness 0.039 0.007 −0.008 0.009 0.034*
(0.049) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Neuroticism 0.033 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.029*
(0.034) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant −0.073 −1.493* 0.189*** 0.053 0.343***−0.464 0.099*** 0.073 0.245***−0.539*
(0.144) (0.783) (0.048) (0.367) (0.072) (0.360) (0.019) (0.264) (0.063) (0.305)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 688 676 685 673 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.014 0.108 0.025 0.047 0.025 0.129 0.007 0.046 -0.003 0.061
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Households with no
forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6), children (7-10), children (11-16), financial
literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income
farming, main income employed, main income self-employed, main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh,
no. of working members in hh, risk preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table 4: Additional Regression on Big5 Measures - Subjective Over-Indebtedness
Subj. Index Debt Position Di↵. Pay o↵ Debt Sacrifice Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Very Negative 0.182 0.213* 0.040 0.035 0.065** 0.056 0.118 0.252**
(0.112) (0.115) (0.114) (0.103) (0.029) (0.039) (0.106) (0.102)
Negative 0.157 0.136 0.096 0.032 0.037 0.034 0.108 0.155
(0.135) (0.113) (0.111) (0.109) (0.025) (0.026) (0.174) (0.157)
Neutral −0.007 0.030 −0.021 −0.003 0.022 0.030 −0.098 −0.061
(0.104) (0.089) (0.096) (0.090) (0.021) (0.020) (0.128) (0.100)
Positive 0.144 0.239** 0.113 0.170** 0.024 0.041* 0.113 0.206*
(0.086) (0.091) (0.071) (0.077) (0.021) (0.023) (0.120) (0.113)
Openness 0.094** 0.058* 0.012 0.113**
(0.036) (0.033) (0.009) (0.049)
Conscientiousness −0.007 0.005 −0.017 0.054
(0.054) (0.042) (0.014) (0.056)
Extraversion −0.042 −0.055 0.007 −0.072
(0.042) (0.037) (0.012) (0.042)
Agreeableness −0.021 −0.026 −0.001 −0.019
(0.042) (0.037) (0.011) (0.050)
Neuroticism 0.058* 0.031 −0.002 0.123**
(0.031) (0.029) (0.009) (0.044)
Constant −0.115 −0.577 −0.064 −1.401** 0.035** 0.183 −0.131 −0.209
(0.082) (0.706) (0.081) (0.646) (0.016) (0.154) (0.111) (0.812)
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 688 676 688 676 686 674 688 676
Adj. R-squared 0.001 0.143 -0.002 0.098 0.002 0.072 -0.001 0.141
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
Households with no forecast error serve as the reference group. Additional controls: age, age squared, children (0-6),
children (7-10), children (11-16), financial literacy score, loss from crime shocks, loss from economic shocks, loss from
environmental shocks, loss from other shocks, main income farming, main income employed, main income self-employed,
main income remittances, monthly household income 2017, no. of elders in hh, no. of working members in hh, risk
preference, self-control, social status, total hh education.
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Table 5: Additional Regression on Predictors for Income Forecast Groups
Very Negative Negative Mildly Negative Neutral Positive
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Monthly Inc. 2017 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 −0.000** −0.000** −0.000***−0.000***−0.000***−0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.016** 0.018*** 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.006 −0.008 −0.006 −0.015* −0.019**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Age Squared −0.000** −0.000** −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 −0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FL-Score −0.022***−0.020***−0.001 −0.001 0.002 0.003 0.019*** 0.017*** 0.002 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007)
Risk Preference 0.006 0.007 −0.015* −0.015 0.018** 0.015* −0.008 −0.007 −0.001 −0.000
(0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Self-Control −0.002 −0.002 0.002 0.002 −0.001 −0.000 0.002 0.002 −0.001 −0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Main Inc. Farming 0.131*** 0.136*** 0.032 0.035 0.008 0.011 0.058 0.053 −0.230***−0.236***
(0.034) (0.037) (0.041) (0.044) (0.053) (0.055) (0.060) (0.062) (0.069) (0.070)
Main Inc. Employed 0.184*** 0.197*** 0.086* 0.089* 0.046 0.034 −0.021 −0.021 −0.295***−0.298***
(0.028) (0.033) (0.049) (0.049) (0.059) (0.064) (0.054) (0.057) (0.078) (0.080)
Main Inc. Self-Emp. 0.144*** 0.155*** 0.116 0.107 −0.146** −0.145** 0.070 0.073 −0.184* −0.190**
(0.046) (0.047) (0.071) (0.071) (0.062) (0.061) (0.068) (0.071) (0.091) (0.087)
Main Inc. Remitt. 0.075* 0.089** 0.001 0.007 0.103 0.094 0.062 0.060 −0.241***−0.251***
(0.036) (0.040) (0.043) (0.040) (0.067) (0.071) (0.066) (0.067) (0.083) (0.083)
Children (0-6 yrs) −0.006 −0.002 0.045 0.044 −0.011 −0.020 −0.022 −0.019 −0.006 −0.003
(0.021) (0.020) (0.028) (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.028) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028)
Children (7-10 yrs) −0.038 −0.038 0.004 −0.009 0.094** 0.095** −0.039* −0.035 −0.021 −0.014
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.029) (0.035) (0.034) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025)
Children (11-16 yrs) 0.028 0.027 0.023 0.018 −0.028 −0.028 −0.000 0.004 −0.023 −0.021
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019)
No. of Elders 0.047** 0.045** 0.026 0.024 0.008 0.008 −0.023 −0.017 −0.058** −0.060**
(0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022) (0.023)
No. of Working Mem. 0.021 0.019 0.037* 0.035* −0.003 0.000 −0.004 −0.004 −0.050** −0.050**
(0.016) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Total HH Education −0.003* −0.003* −0.000 −0.000 −0.003 −0.003 0.001 0.001 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Social Status −0.021 −0.028 −0.015 −0.015 −0.031 −0.034 0.010 0.006 0.057** 0.070**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.028) (0.023) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.025)
Farming Shocks 0.000 −0.000 0.001 −0.000 −0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Environmental Shocks 0.002 0.001 −0.001 −0.000 −0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Economic Shocks −0.000 −0.000 −0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Crime Shocks −0.006** −0.001 −0.003** 0.000 0.009**
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Other Shocks 0.000* −0.000 0.000 −0.000 −0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Certainty −0.001 −0.012 0.020 0.033 −0.040*
(0.022) (0.024) (0.034) (0.022) (0.019)
Constant −0.286 −0.363* 0.035 0.151 0.209 0.089 0.207 0.075 0.835*** 1.047***
(0.219) (0.209) (0.259) (0.267) (0.264) (0.280) (0.220) (0.247) (0.261) (0.269)
Observations 676 664 676 664 676 664 676 664 676 664
Adj. R-squared 0.221 0.224 0.025 0.017 0.041 0.037 0.063 0.055 0.072 0.087
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. Clustered standard errors in parentheses.
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II Description of Variables
Debt Indices
Objective Over-
Indebtedness
Index
It contains the equally weighted average of z-scores of four debt in-
dicators. The procedure of aggregating these specific outcomes is
adapted from Kling et al. (2007). It “improves statistical power”
and helps “to detect e↵ects that go in the same direction” among
indicators (Kling et al., 2007, p.89). The objective over-indebtedness
index captures households with a debt service to income ratio greater
than 40%, a remaining debt service to income ratio greater than 40%,
households, who defaulted on a loan or paid late in the last 12 months
and households with more than two loans. The literature has defined
(kind of arbitrary) thresholds for the DSR indicator beyond which
a household is over-indebted. A household is deemed over-indebted,
for example, if its DSR exceeds - depending on the study - 0.3 to 0.5
(Chichaibelu and Waibel, 2017). Hence, we set the over-indebtedness
threshold at a DSR of 0.4 following what we deem is best practice
among researchers (Georgarakos et al., 2010).
Subjective Over-
indebtedness
Index
It contains the equally weighted average of z-scores of three debt
indicators: the standardized sacrifice index and two assessments on
whether the household has too much debt and whether it has di -
culties paying them o↵.
Debt Measures
Debt Service to
Income Ratio
It is the ratio of all annual interest and principal payments on loans
divided by all annual income generating activities of the household.
Debt Position The question if the household has too much debt right now is asked
twice in almost identical fashion. For this reason, we combine both
questions by deriving two dummy variables, standardize them and
calculate their mean. The exact formulation of both questions is the
following: “I have too much debt right now” (Disagree fully, disagree
strongly, disagree a little, neither agree nor disagree, agree a little,
agree strongly, agree fully) and “Which of the following best describes
your current debt position?” (I have too little debt; I have about the
right amount of debt; I have too much debt right now.). The first
dummy equals 1 if the respondent at least agrees a little and the
second equals 1 if they feel they have too much debt right now.
Di culties to Pay
O↵ Debt
Dummy variable derived from the categorical question with answer
options 1-“I have no di culties paying o↵ my debt”, 2-“I have some
di culties [...]”, and 3-“I have a lot of di culties [...]”, where 1 and
2 are coded to 0 in the dummy and 3 is coded to 1.
Remaining Debt
to Income Ratio
The ratio relates a household’s actual, yearly debt burden to the
average income of 2016 and 2017.
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Sacrifice Index This index is adapted by Schicks (2013), which asks for several sac-
rifices households may make because they lack money. Like them,
we combine these indicators into one “sacrifice index” applying poli-
choric principal component analysis such that a continuous index is
created giving more weight to more serious sacrifices people have to
make and transforming the categorical responses into a continuous
measure (Kolenikov and Angeles, 2009; Smits and Gu¨nther, 2017).
In total, we ask respondents about ten possible sacrifices both for a
shorter term (i.e. twelve months) and for a longer term (five years).
Unlike Schicks (2013), we do not pose questions about the accept-
ability of sacrifices made but ask only for the frequency of distress
events that occurred in the household. We added two questions in-
troduced by Smits and Gu¨nther (2017) and two new questions that
are more context-specific to the rural setting in North-East Thai-
land. Depending on the question asked, respondents could answer
on a scale from 1-3 (e.g. had to work much more, more, not more)
or from 1-5 (e.g. had to buy less food: never, sometimes, regularly,
often, almost always, always).
Income Forecasts
Quantitative
Income Forecast
Relative change between expected median income from the proba-
bilistic expectations elicitation and the actual income in 2017.
Qualitative
Forecast Error
Di↵erence between expected income in 2016 and actual welfare of the
household as evaluated in 2017.
Expectation
Measures
Actual welfare of
the household
Answer to “Do you think your household is better o↵ than last year?”,
from 1-“much worse o↵” to 5-“much better o↵”.
Certainty Answer to “How certain are you that this income development will
truly become reality?”. The scale ranges from 1-“Very uncertain” to
4 “Very certain”.
Expected income Answer to “How do you think your average monthly income will
develop in the next twelve months?”, from 1-“Decrease a lot” to 5-
“Increase a lot”.
Probabilistic
expectations
Probabilities assessing how individuals assess future outcomes.
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Experiment
Measures
Treatment 1=Hard Quiz, 2=Easy Quiz.
Expected Rank Rank that participant expects to reach after taking the test quiz
from 1-“Least questions answered correctly” to 10-“Most questions
answered correctly”.
Number of Goods Amount of goods participant wants to buy.
Overconfidence Di↵erence between expected and actual rank of participant.
Overborrowing Dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if participant wants to buy
more than earnings including endowment can pay for.
Overspending Dummy variable, that takes the value 1 if participant wants to buy
more than earnings excluding endowment can pay for.
Controls
Age Age of respondent in years.
Age Squared Squared term of age.
Financial Literacy
Score
Our index is based on seven questions eliciting financial knowledge,
on nine assessments concerning financial behavior, and on three ques-
tions regarding financial attitude. The overall index is composed of
the sum of the sub indices and ranges between 0 and 22 with higher
numbers indicating a higher level of financial literacy.
Financial Risk
Taking
Answer to “Attitudes towards risk change in di↵erent situations.
When thinking about investing and borrowing are you a person who is
fully prepared to take risk or do you try and avoid taking risk?”, from
1-“Fully unwilling to take risks” to 7-“Fully willing to take risks”.
Part of our risk preference measure.
Main Income
Dummies
We include four income dummies that tell us whether the main in-
come comes from farming, o↵-farm employment, self employment or
remittances.
Monthly Inc.
2017
Monthly household income in 2017
Number of
children
This variable is split in three age categories for the analysis. Num-
ber of children aged 0-6 years; Number of children aged 7-10 years;
Number of children aged 11-16 years.
9
Number of Elders Number of elder household members, defined as people older than 60
years.
Shock loss
indicators
We include information on monetary losses from various shock events
for 2016 and 2017. We hereby separate by five shock categories:
Farming Shocks, Environmental Shocks, Economic Shocks, Crime
Shocks, Other Shocks.
Number of
Working
Members
Number of working household members.
Risk Preference Equally weighted average of risk taking and financial risk taking.
Risk Taking Answer to “Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take
risks or do you try to avoid taking risk?”, from 1-“Fully unwilling
to take risks” to 7-“Fully willing to take risks”. Part of our risk
preference measure.
Self-Control We use the questions introduced by ? and add up the Likert-Scale
answers to one score. The scale ranges from 1-“Disagree fully” to
7-“Agree fully”. The final score ranges from 0 to 49 where lower
numbers indicate a higher level of self-control.
Total HH
Education
Sum of years all working household members went to school.
Big Five -
Personality Traits
Agreeableness A person, who scores high on Agreeableness (Item scale ranges from
1 to 7 for all items) has a forgiving nature, is considerate and kind
and not rude to others.
Conscientiousness A person, who scores high on Conscientiousnes does a thorough job,
works e ciently and is not lazy.
Extraversion A person, who scores high on Extraversion is communicative,
talkative, outgoing and not reserved.
Neuroticism A person, who scores high on Neuroticism worries a lot, gets nervous
easily and is not relaxed.
Openness A person, who scores high on Openness values artistic experiences, is
original and has an active imagination.
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Additional
Controls
Experiment
BMI Respondent’s Body Mass Index as of 2017.
Di culties in
Game
Answer to “Did the respondent have di culties answering ques-
tions?” with 1-“Not at all”, 2-“Yes, a little bit”, 3-“Yes, very much”.
Filled in by the enumerator.
Financial
Decision Maker
Answer to question “Who is responsible for making day-to-day de-
cisions about money in your household?” where means 1-“Myself”,
2-“Myself and someone else” and 3-“Someone else”.
Health Status Health status of the respondent in 2017: 1-“Good”, 2-“Can manage”,
3-“Sick”
Marital Status Respondent’s marital status: 1-“Unmarried”, 2-“Married”, 3-
“Widow”, 4-“Divorced/separated”.
Morning Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the interview took place in
the morning, i.e. before 11am.
Midday Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the interview took place
around noon, i.e. between 12am and 2pm.
Numeracy The numeracy index is based on six questions about simple arithmetic
problems. It ranges between zero and six. Zero, if the respondent
does not give any correct answer and six if the respondent gives only
correct answers.
Read Alone Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant could read
the experimental instructions without help. Filled in by the enumer-
ator.
Relation to HH
Head
Respondent’s relation to the household head: 1-“Head”, 2-
“Wife/Husband”, 3-“Son/Daughter”, 4-“Son/Daughter in law”, 5-
“Father/Mother”, 8-“Grandchild”, 9-“Nephew/Niece”, 11-“Other
relatives”.
Sex Sex of respondent: 1-“Male”, 2-“Female”.
Years of
Schooling
Years respondent went to school.
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III Experimental Material
Material 1: Instructions Experiment
Read out:
I want you to ask some test question to check whether the procedure of the ranking is clear to 
you. If not, I will explain it again.
After you answered this first set of questions, you have to decide how many goods you want 
to buy. The 40 THB that are already in your account are given you as a credit that you can use 
to buy the goods. With the money you earn in the second round in the quiz you will pay back 
your credit. If you spend more money than you earned we will keep the money from your 
account and give you the goods you have bought. If you earned more than you bought, you 
pay back your credit and can keep the rest of the money and goods.
[Hand respondent the first quiz (green paper). If respondent cannot read, assist in all tasks]
If you don’t have any further questions we start with the first round. [FAQ]
In the first round, you will get 7 test questions, which are very similar to the questions you will 
get in the second round. But again, you can ONLY earn money in the second round. 
[Show picture of ranks, payoffs and people]
Test Question 1: What does it mean to be ranked 6? [Open answer; enumerator please 
continue if you think the respondent gave a correct answer]
Test Question 2: How much money do you earn if you are ranked 6? [Answer: 10 THB]
Test Question 3: How many goods you can buy for 10 THB? [Answer: 1]
The money you earn, will be put on your game account which already has 40 THB in it. As you 
can see from the picture, you can earn up to additional 40 THB. The quiz for which you will 
receive money will be played in the second round.
Experiment Script
We want to play a market game with you. In this game you can earn money and buy goods. 
The kind of goods you can buy are placed right next to you. Each piece has a value of 20 THB, 
but we offer them to you for a discounted price of 10 THB. You don’t have to buy one kind of 
product, but can buy different kinds (for example 2 chocolate bars and 1 bag of chips). If you 
don’t like to buy anything you can keep the money you earn. 
To earn money, you have to play a quiz which consists of 15 questions. 10 persons from 
another village, which is similar to your village, took the same quiz before. The amount of 
money you earn is dependent on how many questions you answered right in comparison to 
these villagers. In this picture, the person who has given the most correct answers is ranked 
10, the person who has given the second most correct answers is ranked 9, the person who 
has given the third most correct answers is ranked 8, and so on. In the picture you can also see 
how much money you will earn dependent on your ranking. For example, if you are ranked 7 
you will earn 20 THB. Please take your time to understand how you can earn money in this 
game.
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[Please note which goods were finally kept]
Thank you very much for your participation, we hope you enjoyed the game. I will now 
calculate your earnings and inform my STL which will bring you your payment and goods.
Question 3 [Only ask if expected earning of respondent was more than 0 THB]: Would you 
have buy less goods, if you thought your earnings would be lower?
[Calculate rank, earnings and cash/goods payoff. Wait for STL to hand the money/goods]
{In the very unlikely case, that more goods were wanted than earnings are generated:}
I calculated your earnings and you cannot afford all the goods you want to buy. You want to 
buy […] goods but can only afford […] goods. Please, choose which goods you want to keep.
[Hand the second quiz, set your alarm clock to 10 minutes and tell respondent to start]
The time is up. Please, hand me the second quiz. Before we conclude, I have some final 
questions for you.
Question 1: After taking the quiz, when 1 is the villager who gave the least correct answers 
and 10 is the villager who gave the most correct answers, where do you see yourself in this 
picture?
Question 2 [Only ask if expected earning of respondent was smaller than 40 THB]: Would you 
have buy more goods, if you thought your earnings would be higher?
[Set your alarm clock to 5 minutes and tell the respondent to start]
The 5 minutes are over. Please, stop answering the test quiz and make your decisions on the 
white sheet of paper. Give me a sign when you have made your decisions, then I will collect 
the white paper.
[During the time the respondent takes the second quiz, evaluate the white sheet of paper 
and enter the numbers on the tablet]
Now, in the second round, you play the quiz that decides how much money you earn. You 
have 10 minutes to answer the questions. Afterwards, I will collect the quiz, calculate your 
earnings and hand you the goods and money.
Please read through the questions on the green sheet of paper and try to answer as many 
questions as you can. You have 5 minutes to answer the questions. I will tell you when the 5 
minutes are over. After you have finished the quiz, please have a look on the white piece of 
paper and answer these questions and make your buying decision. When you have finished 
the first round, I will collect the white piece of paper. You can keep the green paper with the 
test quiz. It is only for you, so that you know what kind of questions to expect in the quiz of 
the second round.
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Material 2: Guideline for Interviewers to Answer Questions from Participants
Frequently Asked Questions
Respondent: “What if I don’t want to buy anything?”
You: “You don’t have to buy anything, you can also keep the money.”
Respondent: “Can I spend all my money on buying products?”
You: “Yes you can, but if you do not earn enough money to pay all the products you wanted to
buy, you will only get the part of the products you can afford.”
Respondent: “Can I change my buying decision after I took the second quiz?”
You: “No, your decision is fixed. Only in the case where you wanted to buy more products than
you have money available, you can decide on which products to keep”
Respondent: “What happens if I spend more money on products than I earn?”
You: “Then we will take the money from the 40 THB that are already on your virtual bank
account for the game. If even this is not enough, you only get as many products as you have
money. We will NOT take any out of your pocket and we will NOT take money from the 50 THB
you get for the questionnaire. We only count the money you get in the game.”
Respondent: “Does being on rank 7 means that I need to get 7 questions correct?”
You: “No! It means that three persons have answered more questions correctly than you and six
persons have answered less questions correctly than you. The rank is always dependent on how
many questions you have correct in comparison to the other 10 villagers. In this case you are as
good as the villager who was ranked 7.”
Respondent: “Does it make a difference which questions I answer correctly?”
You: “No, all questions count the same.”
Respondent: “Do the products really cost 20 THB per piece?”
You: “Yes, if you buy them as presented here, they cost 20 THB.”
[Respondent: “What if I don’t know the answer to a question at all?”
You: “Just take a guess. You don’t receive some sort of minus points for wrong answers.”]
Respondent: “What if I cannot finish the quiz in time?”
You: “That is no problem. Please, try to answer as many questions as you can in the given time
frame. There will be no minus points for unanswered questions.”
Respondent: “Who are the other 10 persons who have answered the quiz before?”
You: “They are just some randomly selected persons from another village, that is similar to your
village.”
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Material 3: Quiz-Hard Treatment
Ottawa O positive
Vancouver AB positive
Montreal B positive
Toronto A positive
Chicken Pineapple
Duck Mango
Penguin Banana
Squirrel Passion Fruit
144 Leo
94 Pisces
88 Dragon
126 Scorpio
Hokkaido and Kyushu
Shikoku and Hashima
Okinawa and Okinoshima
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
2. What is the most common blood 
type in the world?
7. Which are the Japanese cities that were hit by atomic 
bombs of the U.S. army during WWII?
5. How many days does Mercury need 
to orbit the sun?
3. Which animal cannot fly? 4. Which fruit contains the most 
amount of Vitamin C per 100g?
6. Which animal is not part of the 
Zodiac?
1. What is the biggest city in Canada by 
population?
Test Quiz
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Tiger Euro
Eagle US. Dollar
Lion Pound
Panda Deutsche Mark
47 provinces Grasshopper 
48 provinces Spider
49 provinces Beetle
50 provinces Centipede
Austria Coca Cola
France Beer
Sweden Tea
Poland
Italy Lungs
France Heart
Spain Liver
Portugal Brain
5. Which of these countries does 
NOT border Germany?
6. Which is the most drank 
beverage in the world?
Coffee
1. What is the national animal of 
China?
7. Which country is the origin of 
pizza?
8. Which of these four is the 
biggest organ of the human body?
Quiz
2. If Thai currency is THB, what is 
the currency of Germany?
3. How many provinces does Japan 
have currently?
4. Which is the heaviest insect in 
the world?
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Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Red
Joko Widodo Gold
Abdurrahman Wahid Green
Megawati Sukarnoputri Pink
Black, Blue and Gold Blueberry
Black, Red and White Pear
Black, Red and Gold Apple
Black, Red and Blue Kiwi
Grey
Dark green
Black
Brown 2 seasons including rainy and winter
Nabi Muhammad
Yahweh
Allah
Moses QID:
3 seasons including rainy, 
winter and spring  
2 seasons including summer 
and winter15. Who is the God of Islam?
10. What color is traditionally not 
associated with Christmas Day?
13. What color will you get if you 
mix blue, red and yellow?
14. How many seasons are there in 
Germany? And which ones?
11. Of which colors is the flag of 
Germany composed of?
12. Which fruit is blue?
4 seasons including spring, 
summer, autumn and winter.
9. Who is the president of 
Indonesia?
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Material 4: Quiz-Easy Treatment
Ubon Ratchathani Grey
Chiang Mai Green
Bangkok White
Surat Thani Pink
Asian Buffalo Banana
Dog Papaya
Elephant Durian
Tiger Apple
Vietnam Monkey
Laos Horse
Cambodia Cat
Myanmar Dragon
Blue
Brown
Green
Hazel
3. Which animal cannot jump? 4. Which fruit is prohibited in public 
transport around South-East Asia?
6. Which animal is not part of the 
Chinese Zodiac?
Test Quiz
5. Which of these countries does NOT 
border Thailand?
2. What color will you get if you mix 
blue and yellow?
7. What is the most common eye color 
in the world?
1. What is the biggest city in Thailand?
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Elephant Euro
Eagle US Dollar
Lion Pound
Naga (Thai Dragon) Franc
76 provinces Blue Shark
77 provinces Killer Whale
78 provinces Blue Whale
79 provinces Elephant
6 3 seasons including summer, rainy and winter
5 2 seasons including summer and rainy 
4 2 seasons including rainy and winter
7
Coconut Milk Skin
Tomatoes Eyes
Oyster Sauce Mouth
Chili Paste Ears
5. How many months have 31 
days?
6. How many seasons are there in 
Thailand? And which ones?
4 seasons including summer, 
rainy, autumn and winter
1. What is the national animal of 
Thailand?
7. Which of these do you need to 
make traditional Som Tam Thai?
8. Which is the biggest sense organ 
of the human body?
Quiz
2. If Thai currency is THB, what is 
the currency of USA?
3. How many provinces does 
Thailand have currently?
4. Which is the biggest animal in 
the world?
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Donald Trump Red
Barack Obama Pink
Angela Merkel Green
Bill Clinton Light blue
Green, White and Red Durian
Green, White and Blue Jackfruit
Blue, White and Red Rambutan
Blue, Red and Yellow Salak
4th Reign Thailan
5th Reign
6th Reign Cambodia
7th Reign
Nabi Muhammad
Jesus
Guanyin
Vishu QID:
China
15. Who is the son of god of 
Christianity?
10. What is the color of the day on 
Wednesday?
13. Which reign of Thailand 
abolished slavery?
Germany
14. Which country has the highest 
total rice consumption?
11. Of which colors is the flag of 
Thailand composed of?
12. Which fruit does not have 
thorns?
9. Who is currently the president 
of the United States of America?
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Material 5: Decision Sheet
Question 2: We told you that the money you will earn in the second
quiz depends on how you actually are ranked in this picture above. For
example if you are ranked 7, which means that 3 villagers gave more
correct answers than you and 6 villagers gave less correct answers
than you,  you will get 20 THB. What do you think, how much money
will you earn?
7
฿
Before you take the second quiz where you can earn money, we have
some questions for you and you have to decide which goods and how
many you want to buy.
8 9 10
0 ฿ 10 ฿ 20 ฿ 40 ฿
1 2 3 4 5 6
Question 1: As mentioned before, 10 persons from another village
took the same quiz as you will have to take now. After taking the test
quiz and knowing the second quiz will be similar: When the villager on
the left side of this picture is the one who gave the least correct
answers and the villager on the right side of this picture is the one
who gave the most correct answers, where do you see yourself in this
picture? Please cross the respective box.
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Detergent
QID:
MangoCoffee
Chips
If you have earned 10 THB for example, we will give you the
goods you wanted to buy and we will deduct 10 THB from the
40 THB credit we gave you. All in all, you have two goods then
and 30 THB.
Please indicate here how many of each good you want. If you do not
want to buy some kind of good put 0 there:
Example: You think you are ranked 7, so you earn 40 THB, and you
want to buy one pack of coffee and one bag of chips. That will cost you
20 THB. After you have answered the second quiz, we will calculate
your earnings.
If you have earned 40 THB for example, we will give you the
goods you wanted to buy and additionally 20 THB.
All in all, you have two goods then and 60 THB.
Question 3: Now, you have to decide how many and which kind of
goods you want. You have to think about how much you will possibly
earn including your credit and how much you can spend on the goods.
You don’t have to buy anything at all. But if you want to, remember
each piece has a discounted price of 10 THB and you can buy as many
different kinds as you want.
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